Best Sexual Harassment Lawyers in Oxnard

Sexual harassment in the workplace is a serious and pervasive issue that can have profound effects on an individual’s professional and personal life. For those affected by such conduct, having skilled legal representation is crucial. Akopyan Law Firm, A.P.C. is recognized as a premier sexual harassment lawyer in Oxnard, California, offering exceptional legal services to those who need it most. Our firm is dedicated to upholding the rights of employees and pursuing justice for those who have been wronged.

Akopyan Law Firm, A.P.C. has a reputation as one of the best sexual harassment law firms in Oxnard, thanks to our extensive experience and commitment to our clients. We approach each case with the thoroughness and attention to detail it deserves, ensuring that our clients receive the highest standard of legal representation.

Types of Sexual Harassment in the Workplace

Sexual harassment in the workplace can present itself in various forms, each of which can significantly disrupt an employee’s work environment and overall well-being. Understanding these different types of harassment is key to recognizing when one’s rights have been violated and taking the necessary legal steps.

Quid Pro Quo Harassment

Quid pro quo harassment is a form of sexual misconduct where a person in a position of authority demands sexual favors in exchange for job-related benefits, such as promotions, pay raises, or continued employment. This form of harassment takes advantage of the power imbalance between the harasser and the victim, creating a coercive and hostile environment. An example of quid pro quo harassment would be a manager suggesting that an employee’s job security depends on submitting to sexual advances.

As a top Oxnard sexual coercion law firm, Akopyan Law Firm, A.P.C. is well-versed in handling quid pro quo cases. We are committed to holding employers accountable and ensuring that employees are protected from such abuses of power.

Hostile Work Environment

A hostile work environment is characterized by unwelcome sexual behavior or comments that are severe or pervasive enough to create an intimidating or offensive work atmosphere. This can include inappropriate jokes, comments, unwanted physical contact, or the display of sexually explicit materials. To establish a hostile work environment, it must be shown that the conduct was either frequent or severe enough to interfere with the victim’s ability to perform their job.

As an experienced Oxnard sexual bullying lawyer, Akopyan Law Firm, A.P.C. works diligently with clients to gather evidence, document incidents, and build a compelling case that illustrates the impact of the harassment on their professional life. We are committed to ensuring that employees can work in an environment free from harassment and discrimination.

Sexual Favoritism

Sexual favoritism occurs when an individual who engages in a consensual sexual relationship with someone in a position of authority receives favorable treatment, such as promotions, salary increases, or better assignments. This form of favoritism can create an unfair and discriminatory environment for other employees who do not engage in such relationships. Although the relationship may be consensual, the resulting preferential treatment can negatively affect the workplace as a whole.

Akopyan Law Firm, A.P.C., known as the best sexual harassment lawyer in Oxnard, understands the complexities involved in sexual favoritism cases. We strive to ensure that all employees are treated equitably and that professional opportunities are based on merit rather than personal relationships.

Third-Party Harassment

Sexual harassment in the workplace is not always perpetrated by colleagues or supervisors. In some cases, the harassment may come from third parties, such as clients, customers, or vendors. Employers are legally required to protect their employees from such harassment and to take prompt and appropriate action when it occurs.

As the leading sexual violation law firm in Oxnard, Akopyan Law Firm, A.P.C. is fully committed to holding employers accountable for maintaining a safe work environment. We recognize the unique challenges posed by third-party harassment and are dedicated to vigorously advocating for our clients’ rights.

Legal Framework for Sexual Harassment

Federal and California state laws provide robust protections against sexual harassment in the workplace. A clear understanding of these legal frameworks is essential for anyone considering taking legal action.

Federal Protections: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is the cornerstone of federal law prohibiting sexual harassment in the workplace. Enforced by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), this statute forbids employers from engaging in or permitting sexual harassment. Title VII applies to employers with 15 or more employees and offers victims a pathway to file complaints, seek mediation, or pursue legal action.

The EEOC provides detailed guidelines on what constitutes sexual harassment and outlines the procedure for filing a claim. As an Oxnard sexual harassment lawyer, Akopyan Law Firm, A.P.C. assists clients in navigating the federal process, ensuring they fully understand their rights and the legal options available to them.

California State Protections: Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA)

California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) offers even broader protections against sexual harassment than federal law. FEHA applies to employers with five or more employees and includes provisions such as mandatory sexual harassment prevention training for both employees and managers.

Victims of sexual harassment under FEHA can file a complaint with the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH). The DFEH has the power to investigate claims and initiate legal action on behalf of the victim. Remedies under FEHA can include compensatory and punitive damages, as well as equitable relief.

As the best sexual harassment attorney in Oxnard, Akopyan Law Firm, A.P.C. is dedicated to ensuring that clients receive the full protections provided under California law. We possess in-depth knowledge of FEHA and use this expertise to offer the most effective legal representation possible.

Why Akopyan Law Firm, A.P.C. Is the Right Choice

Choosing the right legal representation is crucial when facing the challenges of workplace sexual abuse. Akopyan Law Firm, A.P.C. is recognized as the best sexual harassment lawyer in Oxnard because of our commitment to providing personalized and strategic legal services. We take the time to understand each client’s unique circumstances, allowing us to develop a tailored approach that addresses their specific needs.

We recognize the emotional and psychological toll that sexual harassment can take on an individual. As such, we are committed to being strong advocates for our clients, fighting tirelessly to protect their rights and secure the justice they deserve.

Whether you are dealing with quid pro quo harassment, a hostile work environment, or any other form of workplace harassment, Akopyan Law Firm, A.P.C. has the experience and dedication to guide you through the legal process. Our reputation as the best sexual harassment attorney near me is built on our relentless pursuit of justice for our clients.

If you or someone you know is experiencing sexual misconduct at work, it is essential to seek legal assistance as soon as possible. Contact Akopyan Law Firm, A.P.C. today to schedule a consultation with an Oxnard sexual harassment lawyer who will advocate for your rights and help you navigate this challenging time.

Areas Served

The sexual harassment lawyers of the Akopyan Law Firm, A.P.C. serve all of Southern California including but not limited to Adelanto, Agoura Hills, Alhambra, Aliso Viejo, Altadena, Anaheim, Apple Valley, Arcadia, Arleta, Atwater Village, Azuza, Bakersfield, Baldwin Park, Banning, Beaumont, Bell, Bell Gardens, Bellflower, Beverly Hills, Blythe, Boyle Heights, Brea, Brentwood, Buena Park, Burbank, Calabasas, Calimesa, Camarillo, Canoga Park, Canyon Lake, Carson, Cathedral City, Cerritos, Chatsworth, Chino Hills, Chino, Claremont, Coachella, Colton, Compton, Costa Mesa, Corona, Covina, Culver City, Cypress, Dana Point, Desert Hot Springs, Diamond Bar, Downey, Duarte, Eagle Rock, East Hollywood, East Los Angeles, Eastvale, Echo Park, El Monte, El Segundo, El Sereno, Encino, Fontana, Fountain Valley, Fullerton, Gardena, Garden Grove, Glassell Park, Glendale, Glendora, Granada Hills, Hacienda Heights, Hawthorne, Hemet, Hesperia, Highland Park, Highland, Hollywood, Hollywood Hills, Huntington Beach, Huntington Park, Indian Wells, Indio, Inglewood, Irvine, Jurupa Valley, La Canada Flintridge, La-Crescenta Montrose, La Habra, La Mirada, La Palma, La Puente, La Quinta, La Verne, Laguna Beach, Laguna Hills, Laguna Niguel, Laguna Woods, Lakewood, Lake Balboa, Lake Elsinore, Lake Forest, Lancaster, Lawndale, Lincoln Heights, Loma Linda, Long Beach, Los Alamitos, Los Angeles, Los Feliz, Lynwood, Manhattan Beach, Mar Vista, Maywood, Menifee, Mission Hills, Mission Viejo, Monrovia, Montclair, Montebello, Monterey Park, Moorpark, Moreno Valley, Murrieta, Newbury Park, Newhall, Newport Beach, Norco, North Hills, North Hollywood, Northridge, Norwalk, Ontario, Orange, Oxnard, Pacific Palisades, Pacoima, Palos Verdes, Palmdale, Palm Desert, Palm Springs, Panorama City, Paramount, Pasadena, Perris, Pico Rivera, Placentia, Pomona, Porter Ranch, Rancho Cucamonga, Rancho Mirage, Rancho Santa Margarita, Redondo Beach, Reseda, Rialto, Riverside, Rosemead, Rowland Heights, San Bernardino, San Clemente, San Dimas, San Gabriel, San Fernando, San Jacinto, San Juan Capistrano, San Pedro, Santa Ana, Santa Clarita, Santa Monica, Sawtelle, Seal Beach, Shadow Hills, Sherman Oaks, Silver Lake, Simi Valley, South El Monte, South Gate, South Pasadena, South Whittier, Stanton, Studio City, Sun Valley, Sunland, Sylmar, Tarzana, Temecula, Temple City, Thousand Oaks, Toluca Lake, Torrance, Tujunga, Tustin, Twentynine Palms, Upland, Valencia, Valley Glen, Valley Village, Van Nuys, Ventura, Victorville, Walnut, West Covina, West Hills, West Hollywood, West Puente Valley, Westchester, Westminster, Westwood, Whittier, Wildomar, Winnetka, Woodland Hills, Yorba Linda

Best Sexual Harassment Law Firm in Oxnard

If you have been sexually abused in the workplace, call us today at (805) 504-1205 or contact us online to schedule a free case evaluation. Our battle tested sexual harassment lawyers in Oxnard stand ready to help in cases involving sexual harassment in the workplace.

Featured Sexual Harassment Case

Davenport v. Bd. of Trustees of State Ctr. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 654 F. Supp. 2d 1073 (E.D. Cal. 2009)History professor whose employment was terminated on basis of dishonesty, evident unfitness for service, and persistent violation of or refusal to obey school laws of state or district regulations brought pro se action against community college district under Title VII based on unlawful retaliation. The District Court, 2008 WL 170876, dismissed complaint with leave to amend. After professor filed amended complaint, the District Court, 2009 WL 891057 partially granted college’s motion to dismiss amended complaint as to post-employment retaliation claims, but denied motion as to alleged retaliatory acts occurring prior to and including date of termination. Employer moved for summary judgment as to remaining claims. The District Court, Oliver W. Wanger, J., held that: 1 declarations did not conform with statute requiring that they be subscribed as true under penalty of perjury and be executed substantially in statutory form, and their contents were not sworn affidavit in opposition to summary judgment; 2 while professor had to have timely submitted his verified complaint to California Department of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH), that issue did not have to be resolved; 3 even if professor had established prima facie case of retaliation, college’s articulated reason for professor’s termination was legitimate and nonretaliatory; and 4 professor failed to establish pretext.In pertinent part, the Court’s opinion states as follows:

exual harassment is a type of sex discrimination prohibited by Title VII. Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63–67, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986). Accordingly, an employer’s retaliatory conduct in response to an employee’s complaint of sexual harassment, a protected activity, is actionable under Title VII’s antiretaliation provision. See Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 951, 965 (9th Cir.2004); Garcia v. Los Banos Unified Sch. Dist., 418 F.Supp.2d 1194, 1224 (E.D.Cal.2006). A precondition to suit under Title VII is that a plaintiff must first exhaust the administrative remedies available under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5. See Karim–Panahi v. L.A. Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 626 (9th Cir.1988).

Under the statute, a plaintiff must initially file a timely charge with the EEOC and, if dismissed, receive a right-to-sue letter from the agency and then file any related court action within 90 days of receipt of the letter. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(1). Title VII mandates that claims be filed with the EEOC within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory act(s) if the state in which the discriminatory act occurred has a state agency that deals with such matters and the complainant has instituted proceedings with that agency, or within 30 days of receiving notice that the state agency has terminated its proceedings, whichever is earlier. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(e)(1). If no state agency exists, the time limit is 180 days. Id. The United States Supreme Court has explained:

An individual must file a charge within the statutory time period and serve notice upon the person against whom the charge is made. In a State that has an entity with the authority to grant or seek relief with respect to the alleged unlawful practice, an employee who initially files a grievance with that agency must file the charge with the EEOC within 300 days of the employment practice; in all other States, the charge must be filed within 180 days.

Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 109, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002). If not filed within these time limits, a claim is “time barred.” Id.

10 In California, a plaintiff who first files charges with the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing (“DFEH”) must file the charge with the EEOC within 300 days of the alleged unlawful practice. Santa Maria v. Pac. Bell, 202 F.3d 1170, 1176 (9th Cir.2000). However, filing a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in federal court, but a requirement that, like a statute of limitations, is subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393, 102 S.Ct. 1127, 71 L.Ed.2d 234 (1982). Such doctrines *1088 are to be applied sparingly. Nat’l R.R., 536 U.S. at 113–14, 122 S.Ct. 2061.

11 Title VII authorizes the EEOC to enter into “worksharing” agreements with state and local fair employment practice (“FEP”) agencies to “establish effective and integrated resolution procedures.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–8(b); 29 C.F.R. § 1601.13(c). The DFEH is a designated FEP agency under Title VII and has entered into a worksharing agreement with the EEOC. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.74; Green v. Los Angeles County Superintendent of Sch., 883 F.2d 1472, 1476 (9th Cir.1989). The Ninth Circuit has held that, under this worksharing agreement, a charge filed with the DFEH is deemed constructively filed with the EEOC because the EEOC and DFEH cross-designate the other as its agent for the purpose of receiving charges. EEOC v. Dinuba Med. Clinic, 222 F.3d 580, 585 (9th Cir.2000) (“Constructive filing is made possible by ‘worksharing agreements,’ which designate the EEOC and the state agency each other’s agents for the purpose of receiving charges.”); Laquaglia v. Rio Hotel & Casino, Inc., 186 F.3d 1172, 1175 (9th Cir.1999) (“[A] charge filed with the state agency before the 300–day filing deadline expires is deemed automatically filed with the EEOC on that same day.”); Green, 883 F.2d at 1475–76 (holding that, under EEOC–DFEH worksharing agreement, charge filed with DFEH is deemed to have been filed with the EEOC on the same day); Paige v. State of Cal., 102 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir.1996) (“[T]he filing of a charge with one agency is deemed to be a filing with both.”) In addition, for purposes of determining whether a charge filed with an FEP agency has been constructively filed with the EEOC, the Ninth Circuit has determined that whether the state agency actually forwarded the charge to the EEOC or whether the EEOC actually received it is irrelevant. Laquaglia, 186 F.3d at 1175; Dinuba Med. Clinic, 222 F.3d at 585.

Whether the dual filing doctrine applies to save Plaintiff’s claim depends on when Plaintiff filed his DFEH verified complaint or “B” Complaint. Plaintiff contends he mailed a completed B Complaint form to DFEH on November 30, 2002, which is approximately 208 days after he was suspended from duty by Defendant.¹¹ If this allegation is true, Plaintiff’s complaint would have been filed with DFEH within the 300–day timely filing period prescribed by Title VII. Under the constructive filing doctrine, the DFEH charge is deemed filed with the EEOC on the same day, e.g. within approximately 208 days of the alleged retaliatory act, which would make the charge timely filed for purposes of Title VII’s administrative exhaustion requirements.

Defendant disputes Plaintiff’s assertion that he filed his complaint with DFEH in November 2002, arguing that the agency’s records show Plaintiff filed his complaint with DFEH on June 2, 2006¹² and requests judicial notice of a copy of Plaintiff’s *1089 DFEH complaint that shows Plaintiff’s signature dated November 30, 2002 but also reveals a date-stamp of June 2, 2006 in a box marked “Received Dept. of Fair Employment & Housing Fresno District Office.” (Doc. 79, Exh. F.) Judicial notice was previously taken of this document in the January 17, 2008 and March 31, 2009 orders pursuant to Fed.R.Evid. 201(b) on the ground that it is an official record of a state administrative agency. See Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. Southern Cal. Gas Co., 209 F.2d 380, 385 (9th Cir.1953). On the same ground, Defendant’s request for judicial notice of this document is granted.¹³ Fed.R.Evid. 201.

12 To bring a civil action under FEHA, the aggrieved person must exhaust the administrative remedies provided by California law. Yurick v. Superior Court, 209 Cal.App.3d 1116, 1121, 257 Cal.Rptr. 665 (1989); accord Romano v. Rockwell Int’l, Inc., 14 Cal.4th 479, 492, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 20, 926 P.2d 1114 (1996). Exhaustion in this context requires filing a verified complaint with DFEH within one year of the alleged unlawful employment discrimination, and obtaining notice from DFEH of the right to sue. Cal. Gov’t Code § 12960(d). Neither unverified written information nor oral information relayed to DFEH may substitute for a formal administrative charge:

The statute does not authorize any alternative to the requirement of the filing of a “verified complaint in writing.” Moreover, it would not be practical to allow an employee to substitute unverified information relayed to the DFEH in correspondence, or orally, for a formal administrative charge. The requirement of a “verified complaint in writing” ensures that all interested parties are on notice as to the substance of the allegations.

Cole v. Antelope Valley Union High Sch. Dist., 47 Cal.App.4th 1505, 1515, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 443 (1996).

FEHA’s verified complaint requirement is well-established in the Ninth Circuit. See Rodriguez v. Airborne Express, 265 F.3d 890, 897 (9th Cir.2001) (recognizing the holding in Cole v. Antelope Valley Union High Sch. Dist., 47 Cal.App.4th 1505, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 443, (1996)); Watson v. Chubb & Sons, Inc., 32 Fed.Appx. 827 (9th Cir.2002) (stating that “[f]illing out a pre-complaint questionnaire, alone, was insufficient to exhaust her administrative remedies [under FEHA].”); Peoples v. County of Contra Costa, No. C 07–00051 MHP, 2008 WL 2225671 (N.D.Cal. May 28, 2008).

This summary judgment motion is Defendant’s third challenge to the timeliness of Plaintiff’s verified or “B” Complaint. On June 22, 2007, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that Plaintiff’s retaliation claim is barred because the DFEH’s date stamp established that Plaintiff filed his complaint with DFEH on June 2, 2006. In the January 18, 2007 order, granting Defendant’s motion to dismiss, it was determined that because Plaintiff’s allegation as to the date he filed his DFEH complaint contradicted the DFEH public record, it was disregarded. However, Plaintiff was granted leave to amend.

On March 12, 2008, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint, which included new documents and expanded upon his original allegations concerning the timing of his “B” Complaint. Defendant moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s Title VII claim on April 23, 2008. The motion was granted in part and *1090 denied in part on March 31, 2009. In the March 31 order, it was determined that Plaintiff’s description of his attempts to contact DFEH many additional times raised the possibility of agency neglect or mishandling of Plaintiff’s complaint:

One explanation for the contradiction between the allegations and evidence Plaintiff presents and the DFEH complaint form date-stamped June 2, 2006 which has been judicially noticed is that Plaintiff returned the form as he alleges in November 2002 and DFEH failed to process it until June 2006, perhaps misfiling or misplacing the form. It is also possible that, as Defendant maintains, Plaintiff signed and dated the form on November 30, 2002 but failed to actually submit it to DFEH until June 2006. Defendant himself acknowledges the contradiction, arguing the November 25 notice is inconsistent with the June 2, 2006 complaint form marked “filed” and “received.” A question of fact exists as to when Plaintiff filed his complaint with DFEH, an issue central to resolving the question of whether Plaintiff’s DFEH complaint is properly considered a constructive filing with the EEOC. “It is well-established that questions of fact cannot be resolved or determined on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” (Citations omitted)

(Doc. 66, pg. 29:23–30:8.)

Defendant moves for summary judgment, arguing that “discovery has eliminated any doubt regarding when Plaintiff actually submitted his verified complaint to the DFEH.” (Doc. 75, 10:8–10:10.) Defendant contends that there is no triable issue of fact that the DFEH received Plaintiff’s B Complaint by fax on June 2, 2006, namely (a) the DFEH file between November 19, 2002, (b) the fax information found at the top of Plaintiff’s B Complaint, (c) Plaintiff’s efforts to backdate his B Complaint, and (d) Plaintiff’s own inconsistencies throughout this case.