Sylmar Employment Lawyers

Haycock v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 22 Cal. App. 4th 1473, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 248 (1994), as modified on denial of reh’g (Feb. 28, 1994)

An employee sued  for wrongful discharge. The Superior Court found for the employee. The rmployer appealed. The Court of Appeal held that the trial court improperly usurped jury’s function in deciding, as matter of law, that implied employment contract existed between employee and employer. The trial court improperly usurped jury’s function in deciding, as matter of law, that implied employment contract existed between employee and employer; evidence existed that employee had never been promised permanent employment or told that he could be terminated only for just cause, and that any commitment concerning duration of employment had to be cleared with employer’s attorney’s, and, even if there had been no substantial evidence that employment was at-will, statutory presumption of at-will employment would require submitting issue to jury since presumption affected burden of proof.Existence of implied contract to discharge only for good cause is normally factual question for trier of fact. Because statutory presumption of at-will employment is one affecting burden of proof, rather than one affecting burden of producing evidence, it survives even though there may be conflict in evidence, requiring that issue be presented to jury so long as there is some logical basis for presumption.  The opinion states in pertinent part as follows: “Labor Code section 2922 provides: “An employment, having no specified term, may be terminated at the will of either party on **257 notice to the other. Employment for a specified term means an employment for a period greater than one month.” Labor Code section 2922 has been recognized as creating a presumption. (Foley v. Interactive Data Corp. (1988) 47 Cal.3d 654, 665, 254 Cal.Rptr. 211, 765 P.2d 373.) The statute creates a presumption of at-will employment which may be overcome “by evidence that despite the absence of a specified term, the parties agreed that the employer’s power to terminate would be limited in some way, e.g., by a requirement that termination be based only on ‘good cause.’ [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 677, 254 Cal.Rptr. 211, 765 P.2d 373.) Evidence which may be considered in determining the existence of an implied in fact contract to terminate only for good cause includes: “ ‘[T]he personnel policies or practices of the employer, the employee’s longevity of service, actions or communications by the employer reflecting assurances of continued employment, and the practices of the industry in which the employee is engaged.’ [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 680, 254 Cal.Rptr. 211, 765 P.2d 373.) The California Supreme Court has held that the presumption of at-will employment exists because of public policy considerations. In Consolidated Theatres, Inc. v. Theatrical Stage Employees Union (1968) 69 Cal.2d 713, 727, fn. 12, 73 Cal.Rptr. 213, 447 P.2d 325, the court *1489 held: “Contracts of employment wherein the only consideration is the services to be performed thereunder and which are silent as to duration, are terminable at will upon reasonable notice without regard to duration. [Citations.] Special policy considerations require this result. ‘[T]he courts have not deemed it to be their function … to compel a person to accept or retain another in his [or her] employ, nor to compel any person against [her or] his will to remain in the employ of another. Indeed, they have consistently held that in such a confidential relationship, the privilege [to terminate] is absolute, and its presence of ill will or improper motive will not destroy it.’ [Citation.]” (Original emphasis.) As will be discussed later, it is of importance that the presumption of at-will employment is premised upon public policy considerations. Because the presumption of at-will employment is premised upon public policy considerations, it is one affecting the burden of proof. (See 1 Witkin, Cal.Evidence (3d ed. 1986) Burden of Proof and Presumptions, § 178, pp. 151–154.)