La-Crescenta Montrose Employment Attorneys

The trial attorneys of the Akopyan Law Firm A.P.C. stand ready to fight for the rights of the residents of La-Crescenta Montrose, regardless of whether they are employees or employers.  If your cause is just and involves employment law, give us a call to see how we can help.

La-Crescenta Montrose, California

La Crescenta-Montrose is an unincorporated area in Los Angeles County. The community is bordered by Glendale to the south and west, La Cañada Flintridge to the east, and Angeles National Forest to the north.  La-Crescenta Montrose is situated in the Verdugo foothills of the Crescenta Valley, and is home to more than 20,000 residents.  It covers approximately three square miles, and encompasses the following zip codes: 91020, and 91214. La Crescenta-Montrose is a charming community with an interesting past: In the late 18th century, Spanish explorers and missionaries arrived in California. They established missions and presidios in the region, including the nearby San Gabriel Mission, which played a significant role in the history of Southern California. After Mexico gained independence from Spain, the Mexican government granted large tracts of land, including parts of present-day La Crescenta-Montrose, to private individuals. One such land grant was the Rancho La Cañada, which covered a substantial portion of the area. With the signing of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848, California became part of the United States. During the California Gold Rush of 1849, many settlers arrived in the area, and the process of American settlement began in earnest. The development of La Crescenta began in the late 19th century when Dr. Benjamin Briggs, a dentist from Iowa, purchased land in the area. He laid out streets and planted trees, giving the area its distinctive character. La Crescenta means “The Crescent” in Spanish, named for the shape of the valley. Montrose, originally a separate community, was founded by a group of entrepreneurs in the early 20th century. It was named after Montrose, Scotland, and the “Montrose Addition” was annexed to La Crescenta in 1913, forming the community of La Crescenta-Montrose. In the early 20th century, the area was known for its citrus orchards and agriculture. As the greater Los Angeles area grew, La Crescenta-Montrose saw suburban development and an increase in population. Today, La Crescenta-Montrose is a suburban community within the Los Angeles metropolitan area. It is known for its excellent schools, beautiful parks, and a strong sense of community. It has preserved much of its natural beauty and remains a desirable place to live within Los Angeles County. Throughout its history, La Crescenta-Montrose has evolved from Native American lands to Spanish and Mexican land grants, American settlement, and suburban development. It continues to be a unique and picturesque part of Southern California. The Akopyan Law Firm A.P.C. is headquartered in Los Angeles which is minutes away from La-Crescenta Montrose. Our employment lawyers stand ready to provide legal services to both employees and employers in La-Crescenta Montrose.

Ways To Locate The Best Employment Lawyer in La-Crescenta Montrose

In La Crescenta-Montrose, a thriving community like many others, residents have access to a multitude of legal professionals. When it comes to employment law matters, finding the right attorney can be a challenging task, particularly when online searches for the “best wrongful termination lawyer in La Crescenta or Montrose” yield numerous paid advertisements from lawyers across various locations. At the Akopyan Law Firm, A.P.C., we understand the difficulties residents face in selecting the right legal representation. We recognize that it can be challenging to assess an attorney’s true expertise and experience when relying solely on internet advertisements. Our attorneys, each with nearly two decades of experience, are dedicated to providing top-tier legal services in employment law. We have a strong track record of success in representing both employees and employers, demonstrating our commitment to delivering results. Quality is our guiding principle, and we prioritize it over quantity. We believe that our actions in the courtroom speak louder than any advertising campaign. While we acknowledge the importance of online reviews, we also encourage potential clients to reach out for client references, ensuring that you have a comprehensive understanding of our capabilities. With offices located just minutes away from La Crescenta-Montrose, we are poised to offer residents high-caliber legal representation. If you are in need of employment lawyers in La Crescenta-Montrose, please do not hesitate to contact us for a complimentary case evaluation. We are here to serve the community with exceptional legal expertise and commitment.

We Are Ready To Help La-Crescenta Montrose Residents With:

Featured Employment Case

Kentucky Ret. Sys. v. E.E.O.C., (2008) 554 U.S. 135.
The facts of this case were as follows: Kentucky permitted “hazardous position” workers, e.g., policemen, to receive normal retirement benefits after working either 20 years or 5 years and attaining age 55 and pays “disability retirement” benefits to workers meeting specified requirements. Kentucky’s “Plan” calculated normal retirement benefits based on actual years of service. The Plan calculated disability benefits by adding to an employee’s actual years of service the number of years that the employee would have had to continue working in order to become eligible for normal retirement benefits, adding no more than the number of years the employee had previously worked. Charles Lickteig, who continued working after becoming eligible for retirement at age 55, became disabled and retired at age 61. He filed an age discrimination complaint with respondent (EEOC) after the Plan based his pension on his actual years of service without imputing any additional years. The EEOC filed suit against Kentucky and others (collectively Kentucky), arguing that the Plan failed to impute years solely because Lickteig became disabled after age 55. The District Court granted Kentucky summary judgment, holding that the EEOC could not establish age discrimination, but the Sixth Circuit ultimately reversed on the ground that the Plan violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA).
The United States Supreme Court held that Kentucky’s system did not discriminate against workers who become disabled after becoming eligible for retirement based on age. The Court explained as follows: The ADEA forbids an employer to “discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s age.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (emphasis added). A plaintiff claiming age-related “disparate treatment” (i.e., intentional discrimination) must prove that age “actually motivated the employer’s decision.” Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610, 113 S.Ct. 1701, 123 L.Ed.2d 338 (emphasis added). In Hazen Paper, the Court found that, without evidence of intent, a dismissal based on pension status was not a dismissal “because of … age,” id., at 611–612, 113 S.Ct. 1701, noting that, though pension status depended upon years of service, and years of service typically go hand in hand with age, the two concepts are “analytically distinct,” id., at 611, 113 S.Ct. 1701. And the dismissal at issue there, if based purely on pension status, would not embody the evils prompting the ADEA: It was not based on a “prohibited stereotype” of older workers, did not produce any “attendant stigma” to those workers, and was not “the result of **2363 an inaccurate and denigrating generalization about age.” Id., at 612, 113 S.Ct. 1701. However, the Court noted that discrimination based on pension status could violate the ADEA if pension status was a “proxy for age.” Id., at 613, 113 S.Ct. 1701. Applying Hazen Paper, the circumstances here, taken together, show that the differences in treatment in this particular instance were not “actually motivated” by age. (1) Age and pension status remain “analytically distinct” concepts. (2) Here, several background circumstances eliminate the possibility that pension status serves as a “proxy for age.” Rather than an individual employment decision, at issue here are complex systemwide rules involving not wages, but pensions—a benefit the ADEA treats somewhat more flexibly and leniently in respect to age. Further, Congress has otherwise approved programs, such as Social Security Disability Insurance, that calculate disability benefits using a formula that expressly takes account of age. (3) The disparity here has a clear non-age-related rationale. The Plan’s disability rules track Kentucky’s “normal retirement” rules by imputing only those additional years of service needed to bring the disabled worker’s total to 20 or to the number of years that the individual would have worked had he worked to age 55. Thus, the disability rules’ purpose is to treat a disabled worker as though he had become disabled after, rather than before, he had become eligible for “normal retirement” benefits. Age factors into the disability calculation only because the normal retirement rules themselves permissibly consider age. The Plan simply seeks to treat disabled employees as if they had worked until the point at which they would be eligible for a normal pension. Thus, the disparity turns upon pension eligibility and nothing more. (4) Although the Plan placed an older worker at a disadvantage here, in other cases, the rules can work to the advantage of older workers, who may get a bigger boost of imputed years than younger workers. (5) Kentucky’s system does not rely on the sorts of stereotypical assumptions, e.g., the work capacity of “older” workers relative to “younger” workers, that the ADEA sought to eradicate. The Plan’s “assumptions” that no disabled worker would have continued to work beyond the point at which he was both disabled and pension eligible do not involve age-related stereotypes, but apply equally to all workers regardless of age. (6) The nature of the Plan’s eligibility requirements means that, unless Kentucky were severely to cut the benefits to disabled workers who are not yet pension eligible, it would have to increase the benefits available to disabled, pension-eligible workers, while lacking any clear criteria for determining how many extra years to impute for those already 55 or older. The difficulty of finding a remedy that can both correct the disparity and achieve the Plan’s legitimate objective—providing each disabled worker with a sufficient retirement benefit—further suggests that this objective, not age, “actually motivated” the Plan.

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Millions of Dollars Recovered For Our Clients

Check Out Our Case Results

$6.131 MillionEmployment: Disability Discrimination
$3.85 MillionEmployment: Wrongful Termination
$950 ThousandEmployment: Retaliation
$800 ThousandEmployment: Sexual Harassment
$750 ThousandEmployment: Sexual Harassment
$700 ThousandEmployment: Wrongful Termination / Race Discrimination
$658 ThousandEmployment: Sexual Harassment
$650 ThousandPersonal Injury: Automobile Collision
$375 ThousandEmployment: Sexual Harassment
$325 ThousandEmployment: Sexual Harassment
$300 ThousandEmployment: Wrongful Termination / Race Discrimination
$295 ThousandEmployment: Wage and Hour
$265 ThousandEmployment: Sexual Harassment
$250 ThousandEmployment: Pregnancy Discrimination
$250 ThousandEmployment Law: Disability Discrimination
$240 ThousandEmployment: Disability Discrimination
$240 ThousandEmployment: Sexual Harassment
$200 ThousandEmployment: Wrongful Termination
$199 ThousandEmployment: Pregnancy Discrimination
$195 ThousandEmployment: Religious Discrimination
$193 ThousandEmployment: Failure to Accommodate
$180 ThousandEmployment: Unpaid Wages
$175 ThousandEmployment: Whistleblower Retaliation
$175 ThousandEmployment: Medical Leave Retaliation
$174 ThousandEmployment: Wage and Hour
$167 ThousandEmployment: Wage and Hour
$160 ThousandEmployment: Unpaid Wages
$158 ThousandBreach of Contract
$150 ThousandEmployment: Reverse Race Discrimination
$130 ThousandEmployment: Race Discrimination
$125 ThousandEmployment: Sexual Harassment
$125 ThousandEmployment: Disability Discrimination
$125 ThousandEmployment: Medical Leave Retaliation
$120 ThousandEmployment: Unpaid Commission Wages
$120 ThousandEmployment: Retaliation
$120 ThousandPersonal Injury: Automobile Collision
$107 ThousandEmployment: Whistleblower Retaliation
$100 ThousandEmployment: Religious Discrimination
$100 ThousandEmployment: Failure to Accommodate
$100 ThousandEmployment: Wrongful Termination
$100 ThousandPersonal Injury: Bicycle Collision
$100 ThousandPersonal Injury: Pedestrian Collision