Norco Employment Attorneys
The trial attorneys of the Akopyan Law Firm A.P.C. are prepared to vigorously defend the rights of Norco’s residents, whether they are employees or employers. If you believe that your cause is just and it involves matters related to employment law, we encourage you to reach out to us. Our dedicated legal team is here to provide guidance, support, and effective representation. We are committed to ensuring that justice prevails in all employment-related matters, and we stand ready to provide our expertise to the residents of Norco.
Norco, California
Norco is city located in Riverside County. Norco covers fourteen square miles and is home to roughly 26,000 residents. Norco lies within zip code 92860.
Norco, often referred to as “The Vale of Dreams Come True,” was envisioned by developer Rex Clark in 1923 as a utopian settlement for independent farmers, offering an escape from city life and the promise of self-reliance. However, Norco’s history dates back to the early 20th century when it was part of the undivided Rancho La Sierra.
In 1908, Willits J. Hole and George Pillsbury purchased the land, and Hole subdivided the eastern portion into farm and town lots, while farming a significant portion for nearly 30 years. Investors formed the Citrus Belt Land Company, which developed Orchard Heights, a successful farming area. Rex Clark’s vision materialized as the North Corona Land Company’s “Norco.” The town featured a central village with a general store, gas station, and the Norco Garage. A manufacturing district supported home construction and farming needs. Norco boasted a pavilion, the Norco School, and a lighthouse on Beacon Hill. Rex Clark’s Norconian Resort, a grand 1920s project, became a notable landmark. Unfortunately, it faced financial challenges and eventually became a World War II-era hospital. Today, Norco cherishes its equestrian heritage and maintains some remnants of its past, preserving its historical essence amidst modern development.
The Best Employment Lawyer in Norco
Norco, as a vibrant community, offers its residents a multitude of choices when it comes to legal representation. Lawyers and law firms are abundant, with many of them vying for your attention through online advertisements. A simple online search for “employment lawyer Norco” or “wrongful termination attorney Norco” can inundate you with paid advertisements from lawyers near and far. Selecting the right attorney in such a crowded landscape can be a daunting task. It’s challenging to ascertain if a particular attorney possesses the expertise and experience required to handle employment trials and litigation effectively when all you have to go on is an online ad. At the Akopyan Law Firm, A.P.C., each of our attorneys brings nearly two decades of experience to the table. We have established a track record of success in representing both employees and employers. Our approach prioritizes quality over quantity. Rather than flooding the digital space with paid advertisements, we believe in delivering exceptional legal services. With offices strategically located just minutes away from Norco, we are poised to provide residents of Norco with the highest caliber of legal representation. Our offices are conveniently situated in San Bernardino, Riverside, Orange, and Los Angeles, ensuring that our employment lawyers are readily accessible to meet your legal needs. We are committed to offering world-class services and top-notch representation, guided by our extensive experience and dedication to our clients. When you choose the Akopyan Law Firm, A.P.C., you can trust that your legal matters will be handled with the utmost professionalism and skill.
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Featured Employment Case
After petitioner Marvin Green complained to his employer, the United States Postal Service, that he was denied a promotion because he was black, his supervisors accused him of the crime of intentionally delaying the mail. In an agreement signed December 16, 2009, the Postal Service agreed not to pursue criminal charges, and Green agreed either to retire or to accept another position in a remote location for much less money. Green chose to retire and submitted his resignation paperwork on February 9, 2010, effective March 31. On March 22—41 days after resigning and 96 days after signing the agreement—Green reported an unlawful constructive discharge to an Equal Employment Opportunity counselor, an administrative prerequisite to filing a complaint alleging discrimination or retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See 29 CFR § 1614.105(a)(1). Green eventually filed suit in Federal District Court, which dismissed his complaint as untimely because he had not contacted the counselor within 45 days of the “matter alleged to be discriminatory,” ibid. The Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding that the 45–day limitations period began to run on December 16, the date Green signed the agreement. the United States Supreme Court held as follows: (a) Where, as here, the regulatory text itself is not unambiguously clear, the Court relies on the standard rule for limitations periods, which provides that a limitations period ordinarily begins to run “ ‘when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action,’ ” Graham County Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson, 545 U.S. 409, 418, 125 S.Ct. 2444, 162 L.Ed.2d 390. Applied here, that rule offers three persuasive reasons to include the employee’s resignation in the limitations period. (i) First, resignation is part of the “complete and present cause of action” in a constructive-discharge claim, which comprises two basic elements: discriminatory conduct such that a reasonable employee would have felt compelled to resign and actual resignation, Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 148, 124 S.Ct. 2342, 159 L.Ed.2d 204. Until he resigns, an employee does not have a “complete and present cause of action” for constructive discharge. Under the standard rule, only after the employee has a complete and present cause of action does that trigger the limitations period. In this respect, a constructive-discharge claim is no different from an ordinary wrongful-discharge claim, which accrues only after the employee is fired. (ii) Second, although the standard rule may be subject to exception where clearly indicated by the text creating the limitations period, nothing in Title VII or the regulation suggests such displacement. To the contrary, it is natural to read “matter alleged to be discriminatory” as including the allegation forming the basis of the claim, which confirms the standard rule’s applicability. (iii) Third, practical considerations also confirm the merit of applying the standard rule. Starting the clock ticking before a plaintiff can actually file suit does **1773 little to further the limitations period’s goals and actively negates Title VII’s remedial structure. A “limitations perio[d] should not commence to run so soon that it becomes difficult for a layman to invoke the protection of the civil rights statutes.” Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 262, n. 16, 101 S.Ct. 498, 66 L.Ed.2d 431. Nothing in the regulation suggests a two-step process in which an employee would have to file a complaint after an employer’s discriminatory conduct, only to be forced to amend that complaint to allege constructive discharge after resigning. Requiring that a complaint be filed before resignation occurs would also, e.g., ignore that an employee may not be in a position to leave his job immediately. (b) Arguments against applying the standard rule here are rejected. Suders stands not for the proposition that a constructive discharge is tantamount to a formal discharge for remedial purposes only, but for the rule that constructive discharge is a claim distinct from the underlying discriminatory act, 542 U.S., at 149, 124 S.Ct. 2342. Nor was Green’s resignation the mere inevitable consequence of the Postal Service’s discriminatory conduct. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 101 S.Ct. 498, 66 L.Ed.2d 431, distinguished. Finally, the important goal of promoting conciliation through early, informal contact with a counselor does not warrant treating a constructive discharge different from an actual discharge for purposes of the limitations period.
Green v. Brennan, 578 U.S. 547 (2016)
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