Moorpark Employment Attorneys

A former United States Postal Service (USPS) employee, an Evangelical Christian who believed for religious reasons that Sunday should be devoted to worship and rest, brought action against the Postmaster General under Title VII, alleging the Postal Service failed to make reasonable accommodations for his Sunday Sabbath practice and instead disciplined him for failing to work as a letter carrier on Sundays. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Jeffrey L. Schmehl, J., 2021 WL 1264030, granted summary judgment to the Postmaster, and employee appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, Shwartz, Circuit Judge, 35 F.4th 162, affirmed. Certiorari was granted. In a unanimous opinion, the Supreme Court, Justice Alito, held that to defend denial of a religious accommodation under Title VII, an employer must show that the burden of granting an accommodation would result in substantial increased costs in relation to the conduct of its particular business; abrogating Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Walmart Stores East, L.P., 992 F.3d 656; Tagore v. U.S., 735 F.3d 324; Wagner v. Saint Joseph’s/Candler Health System, Inc., 2022 WL 905551; Camara v. Epps Air Service, Inc., 292 F. Supp. 3d 1314; El-Amin v. First Transit, Inc., 2005 WL 1118175; E.E.O.C. v. Sambo’s of Georgia, Inc., 530 F.Supp. 86. We hold that showing “more than a de minimis cost,” as that phrase is used in common parlance, does not suffice to establish “undue hardship” under Title VII. Hardison cannot be reduced to that one phrase. In describing an employer’s “undue hardship” defense, Hardison referred repeatedly to “substantial” burdens, and that formulation better explains the decision. We therefore, like the parties, understand Hardison to mean that “undue hardship” is shown when a burden is substantial in the overall context of an employer’s business. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 61–62 (argument of Solicitor General). This fact-specific inquiry comports with both Hardison and the meaning of “undue hardship” in ordinary speech.  In part the opinion states as follows:  “As we have explained, we do not write on a blank slate in determining what an employer must prove to defend a denial of a religious accommodation, but we think it reasonable to begin with Title VII’s text. After all, as we have stressed over and over again in recent years, statutory interpretation must “begi[n] with,” and ultimately heed, what a statute actually says. National Assn. of Mfrs. v. Department of Defense, 583 U. S. 109, ––––, 138 S.Ct. 617, 631, 199 L.Ed.2d 501 (2018) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Bartenwerfer v. Buckley, 598 U. S. 69, 74, 143 S.Ct. 665, 214 L.Ed.2d 434 (2023); Intel Corp. Investment Policy Comm. v. Sulyma, 589 U. S. ––––, –––– – ––––, ––––, 140 S.Ct. 768, 775–776, 777–778, 206 L.Ed.2d 103 (2020).Here, the key statutory term is “undue hardship.” In common parlance, a “hardship” is, at a minimum, “something hard to bear.” Random House Dictionary of the English Language 646 (1966) (Random House). Other definitions go further. See, e.g., Webster’s Third *469 New International Dictionary 1033 (1971) (Webster’s Third) (“something that causes or entails suffering or privation”); American Heritage Dictionary 601 (1969) (American Heritage) (“[e]xtreme privation; adversity; suffering”); Black’s Law Dictionary, at 646 (“privation, suffering, adversity”). But under any definition, a hardship is more severe than a mere burden. So even if Title VII said only that an employer need not be made to suffer a “hardship,” an employer could not escape liability simply by showing that an accommodation would impose some sort of additional costs. Those costs would have to rise to the level of hardship, and adding the modifier “undue” means that the requisite burden, privation, or adversity must rise to an “excessive” or “unjustifiable” level. Random House 1547; see, e.g., Webster’s Third 2492 (“inappropriate,” “unsuited,” or “exceeding or violating propriety or fitness”); American Heritage 1398 (“excessive”). The Government agrees, noting that “ ‘undue hardship means something greater than hardship.’ ” Brief for United States 30; see id., at 39 (arguing that “accommodations should be assessed while ‘keep[ing] in mind both words in the key phrase of the actual statutory text: “undue” and “hardship” ’ ” **2295 (quoting Adeyeye v. Heartland Sweeteners, LLC, 721 F.3d 444, 456 (C.A.7 2013)).  When “undue hardship” is understood in this way, it means something very different from a burden that is merely more than de minimis, i.e., something that is “very small or trifling.” Black’s Law Dictionary, at 388. So considering ordinary meaning while taking Hardison as a given, we are pointed toward something closer to Hardison’s references to “substantial additional costs” or “substantial expenditures.” 432 U.S. at 83, n. 14, 97 S.Ct. 2264.”