Valley Glen Employment Lawyers

Thompson v. Tracor Flight Sys., Inc., 86 Cal. App. 4th 1156, 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 95 (2001)

Former employee brought wrongful termination action against employer, alleging constructive discharge from her position as director of human resources and retaliatory discharge for engaging in protected activities. The Superior Court, Kern County, No. 231199, Jon E. Stuebbe, J., entered judgment on jury’s verdict for employee. Employer appealed. The Court of Appeal, Vartabedian, Acting P.J., held that: (1) evidence established intolerable working conditions, as element of constructive discharge, and (2) trial court did not abuse its equitable discretion by refusing to bar or limit employer’s damages, based on after-acquired evidence that employee had taken home copies of company documents.  In its opinion the court explanded on the notion of construction discharge: “An employer is considered to have discharged an employee when “the employer’s conduct effectively forces an employee to resign. Although the employee may say, ‘I quit,’ the employment relationship is actually severed involuntarily by the employer’s acts, against the employee’s will.” (Turner v. Anheuser–Busch, Inc. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1238, 1244–1245, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 223, 876 P.2d 1022 [hereafter Turner].) This form of termination of the employment relationship is commonly known as “constructive discharge” and it is “legally regarded as a firing rather than a resignation.” (Id. at p. 1245, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 223, 876 P.2d 1022.) In Turner, the Supreme Court traced the development of the constructive discharge doctrine from cases decided under the National Labor Relations Act, through federal employment discrimination cases, and into state law wrongful discharge cases. (Turner, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1246, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 223, 876 P.2d 1022.) The opinion then traced the development of the standard in the appellate courts of California, noting there were two primary aspects necessary for a finding of constructive discharge: first, there must be intolerable working conditions; second, the employer must in some manner be held to knowledge of the conditions. (Id. at p. 1251, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 223, 876 P.2d 1022.)  As to the second issue, the Turner court modified the law as it had been established by the Court of Appeal. Rejecting liability based on constructive knowledge, the Turner opinion held that the employer must “either intentionally create[ ] or knowingly permit[ ]” the intolerable conditions in order to be held liable. (Turner, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1251, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 223, 876 P.2d 1022.) As to the first issue, however, Turner reaffirmed the “intolerable conditions” requirement in the same terms as it **103 had been developed in the federal courts and in the California Court of Appeal: “The essence of the test is whether, under all the circumstances, the working conditions are so unusually adverse that a reasonable employee in plaintiff’s position ‘ “ ‘would have felt compelled to resign.’ ” ‘ [Citations.]” (Turner, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1247, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 223, 876 P.2d 1022.) More specifically, “[t]he conditions giving rise to the resignation must be sufficiently extraordinary and egregious to overcome the normal motivation of a competent, diligent, and reasonable employee to remain on the job to earn a livelihood and to serve his or her employer. The proper focus is on whether the resignation was coerced, not whether it was simply one rational option for the employee.” (Id. at p. 1246, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 223, 876 P.2d 1022.) “