Monrovia Employment Attorneys

The trial attorneys of the Akopyan Law Firm A.P.C. stand ready to fight for the rights of the residents of Monrovia, regardless of whether they are employees or employers. If your cause is just and involves employment law, give us a call to see how we can help.

Monrovia, California

Monrovia is a City in the central San Gabriel valley, and home to more than 40,000 residents. It covers approximately twelve square miles, and encompasses the following zip codes: 91008, 91010, 91016, and 91017. During the late 1880s, a group of men who were successful in both banking and railroad building converted what had once been part of the vast lands of Mission San Gabriel into a community. With only scattered homes and several dirt roads, they managed to build a small town that was “typical of its time, yet unique in spirit.” It still is. On May 17, 1886, lots were sold for the first time at $100 or $150 each; however, to purchase a lot, each owner was required to build a house within the first six months (which cost at least $2,000). This protected the town from land speculators and allowed it to survive during the collapse of the land boom several years later. The founders, as officers and directors of the Monrovia Land and Water Company, promised to plant 8,000 pepper trees along the streets, provide free water to the town and install electric streetlights. The company’s president was William Monroe. Monroe was not the first settler in the City of Monrovia. He was, however, the most important of the founders and the town is named for him. Following the Civil War, Monroe was superintendent of construction for the Southern Pacific Railroad. In 1875, after several lines were built, he moved his family to Los Angeles. By 1880 he had become a member of the Los Angeles City Council and was very active in the community. He left Los Angeles in 1882 for another construction project but returned in 1884. With money earned from the construction project and from the sale of a railroad car of mules, Monroe bought 210 acres of Rancho Santa Anita from E.J. “Lucky” Baldwin. He moved his family into a tent on the property until they built a small cottage where they lived until their permanent home, “The Oaks,” was completed. “The Oaks” is still standing at 250 N. Primrose Avenue. Myrtle Avenue, Monrovia’s Main Street, is named for his elder daughter Myrtle. The Monroe family periodically returned to Monrovia many times over the years. Mrs. Monroe died at the age of 86 in 1932, and three years later, Mr. Monroe died at the age of 94. William Monroe and his family are buried in Live Oak Cemetery on Duarte Road in Monrovia. William Monroe found success in a variety of careers, including school teacher, banker, hotel manager, mayor, council member, real estate developer, broker, railroad contractor and railroad superintendent. He will be remembered here, though, for the town he founded. During a resurgence beginning in the 1970s, Monrovia made a huge effort to revitalize business and neighborhoods. By 1995, the City and community were honored with the All-America City Award by the National Civic League. This was a boost to community pride and made Monrovia an even more attractive gem of the San Gabriel Valley. The Akopyan Law Firm A.P.C. is headquartered in Los Angeles which is minutes away from Monrovia. Our employment lawyers stand ready to provide legal services to both employees and employers in Monrovia.

Your Search For The Best Employment Lawyer in Monrovia Is Over

Monrovia is indeed a thriving community, offering its residents a plethora of choices when it comes to legal representation. When you embark on an online search for an “employment lawyer in Monrovia” or a “wrongful termination attorney in Monrovia,” it’s common to encounter paid advertisements from employment lawyers hailing from various locations. However, the challenge often lies in selecting the right attorney with the necessary skills and experience, particularly when your decision primarily relies on a paid internet advertisement. For individuals in Monrovia facing significant legal issues and real-world challenges within the realm of employment law, it can be quite challenging to determine whether a particular attorney possesses a profound understanding of this field and the requisite experience to adeptly handle employment trials and litigation, especially when their primary source of information is an advertisement. At the Akopyan Law Firm, A.P.C., every attorney boasts nearly two decades of invaluable experience. Our legal team has consistently achieved favorable outcomes for both employees and employers, establishing an undeniable track record of success. Our firm’s core principle revolves around prioritizing quality over quantity, ensuring that each case receives the utmost attention and expertise. With offices conveniently located just minutes away from Monrovia, we are fully prepared to offer Monrovia residents top-tier legal representation. Your legal needs are our priority, and we stand ready to provide world-class service to the residents of Monrovia.

We Can Represent Monrovia Residents In Employment Litigaton, Including Cases Involving:

Featured Employment Case

Petitioner Reeves, 57, and Joe Oswalt, in his mid-thirties, were the supervisors in one of respondent’s departments known as the “Hinge Room,” which was managed by Russell Caldwell, 45. Reeves’ responsibilities included recording the attendance and hours worked by employees under his supervision. In 1995, Caldwell informed Powe Chesnut, the company’s director of manufacturing, that Hinge Room production was down because employees were often absent, coming in late, and leaving early. Because the monthly attendance reports did not indicate a problem, Chesnut ordered an audit, which, according to his testimony, revealed numerous timekeeping errors and misrepresentations by Caldwell, Reeves, and Oswalt. Chesnut and other company officials recommended **2101 to the company president, Sandra Sanderson, that Reeves and Caldwell be fired, and she complied. Reeves filed this suit, contending that he had been terminated because of his age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA). At trial, respondent contended Reeves had been fired due to his failure to maintain accurate attendance records. Reeves attempted to demonstrate that this explanation was pretext for age discrimination, introducing evidence that he had accurately recorded the attendance and hours of the employees he supervised, and that Chesnut, whom Oswalt described as wielding “absolute power” within the company, had demonstrated age-based animus in his dealings with him. The District Court denied respondent’s motions for judgment as a matter of law under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50, and the case went to the jury, which returned a verdict for Reeves. The Fifth Circuit reversed. Although recognizing that Reeves may well have offered sufficient evidence for the jury to have found that respondent’s explanation was pretextual, the court explained that this did not mean that Reeves had presented sufficient evidence to show that he had been fired because of his age. In finding the evidence insufficient, the court weighed the additional evidence of discrimination introduced by Reeves against other circumstances surrounding his discharge, including that Chesnut’s age-based comments were not made in the direct context of Reeves’ termination; there was no allegation that the other individuals who recommended his firing *134 were motivated by age; two of those officials were over 50; all three Hinge Room supervisors were accused of inaccurate recordkeeping; and several of respondent’s managers were over 50 when Reeves was fired.

The United States Supreme Court held that:

1. A plaintiff’s prima facie case of discrimination (as defined in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668, and subsequent decisions), combined with sufficient evidence for a reasonable factfinder to reject the employer’s nondiscriminatory explanation for its decision, may be adequate to sustain a finding of liability for intentional discrimination under the ADEA. In this case, Reeves established a prima facie case and made a substantial showing that respondent’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation, i.e., his shoddy recordkeeping, was false. He offered evidence showing that he had properly maintained the attendance records in question and that cast doubt on whether he was responsible for any failure to discipline late and absent employees. In holding that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the jury’s verdict, the Fifth Circuit ignored this evidence, as well as the evidence supporting Reeves’ prima facie case, and instead confined its review of the evidence favoring Reeves to that showing that Chesnut had directed derogatory, age-based comments at Reeves, and that Chesnut had singled him out for harsher treatment than younger employees. It is therefore apparent that the court believed that only this additional evidence of discrimination was relevant to whether the jury’s verdict should stand. In so reasoning, the court misconceived the evidentiary burden borne by plaintiffs who attempt to prove intentional discrimination through indirect evidence. In St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407, the Court stated that, because the factfinder’s disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant, together with the elements of the prima facie case, may suffice to show intentional discrimination, rejection of the defendant’s proffered reasons will permit the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination. Proof that the defendant’s explanation is unworthy of credence is simply one form of circumstantial evidence that is probative of intentional discrimination, and it can be quite persuasive. See id., at 517, 113 S.Ct. 2742. In appropriate circumstances, the trier of fact can reasonably **2102 infer from the falsity of the explanation that the employer is dissembling to cover up a discriminatory purpose. See, e.g., Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 296, 112 S.Ct. 2482, 120 L.Ed.2d 225. Moreover, once the employer’s justification has been eliminated, discrimination may well be the most likely alternative explanation, especially since the employer is in the best position to put forth the actual reason for its decision. Cf. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577, 98 S.Ct. 2943, 57 L.Ed.2d 957. Such a showing by the plaintiff will not always be adequate to sustain a jury’s liability finding. Certainly there will be instances where, although the plaintiff has established a prima facie case and *135 introduced sufficient evidence to reject the employer’s explanation, no rational factfinder could conclude that discrimination had occurred. This Court need not—and could not—resolve all such circumstances here. In this case, it suffices to say that a plaintiff’s prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer’s asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated.

2. Respondent was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law under the particular circumstances presented here.

(a) Rule 50 requires a court to render judgment as a matter of law when a party has been fully heard on an issue, and there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue. The standard for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50 mirrors the standard for summary judgment under Rule 56. Thus, the court must review all of the evidence in the record, cf., e.g., Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, but making no credibility determinations or weighing any evidence, e.g., Lytle v. Household Mfg., Inc., 494 U.S. 545, 554–555, 110 S.Ct. 1331, 108 L.Ed.2d 504. The latter functions, along with the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts, are for the jury, not the court. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202. Thus, although the court should review the record as a whole, it must disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe.

(b) In holding that the record contained insufficient evidence to sustain the jury’s verdict, the Fifth Circuit misapplied the standard of review dictated by Rule 50. The court disregarded evidence favorable to Reeves—the evidence supporting his prima facie case and undermining respondent’s nondiscriminatory explanation—and failed to draw all reasonable inferences in his favor. For instance, while acknowledging the potentially damning nature of Chesnut’s age-related comments, the court discounted them on the ground that they were not made in the direct context of Reeves’ termination. And the court discredited Reeves’ evidence that Chesnut was the actual decisionmaker by giving weight to the fact that there was no evidence suggesting the other decisionmakers were motivated by age. Moreover, the other evidence on which the court relied—that Caldwell and Oswalt were also cited for poor recordkeeping, and that respondent employed many managers over age 50—although relevant, is certainly not dispositive. See Furnco, supra, at 580, 98 S.Ct. 2943. The ultimate question in every disparate treatment case is whether the plaintiff was the victim of intentional discrimination. Here, the District Court informed the jury that Reeves was required to show by a preponderance of the evidence that his age was a determining and motivating factor in the decision to terminate *136 him. It instructed the jury that, to show respondent’s explanation was pretextual, Reeves had to demonstrate that age discrimination, not respondent’s explanation, was the real reason for his discharge. **2103 Given that Reeves established a prima facie case, introduced enough evidence for the jury to reject respondent’s explanation, and produced additional evidence that Chesnut was motivated by age-based animus and was principally responsible for Reeves’ firing, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that respondent had intentionally discriminated.

Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 133–36, 120 S. Ct. 2097, 2100–03, 147 L. Ed. 2d 105 (2000)

Avvo Rating 10 Superb

Millions of Dollars Recovered For Our Clients

Check Out Our Case Results

$6.131 MillionEmployment: Disability Discrimination

$3.85 MillionEmployment: Wrongful Termination

$950 ThousandEmployment: Retaliation

$800 ThousandEmployment: Sexual Harassment

$750 ThousandEmployment: Sexual Harassment

$700 ThousandEmployment: Wrongful Termination / Race Discrimination

$658 ThousandEmployment: Sexual Harassment

$650 ThousandPersonal Injury: Automobile Collision

$400 ThousandEmployment: Constructive Termination

$375 ThousandEmployment: Sexual Harassment

$325 ThousandEmployment: Sexual Harassment

$300 ThousandEmployment: Wrongful Termination / Race Discrimination

$295 ThousandEmployment: Wage and Hour

$265 ThousandEmployment: Sexual Harassment

$250 ThousandEmployment: Pregnancy Discrimination

$250 ThousandEmployment Law: Disability Discrimination

$240 ThousandEmployment: Disability Discrimination

$240 ThousandEmployment: Sexual Harassment

$210 ThousandEmployment: Family Leave Retaliation

$200 ThousandEmployment: Wrongful Termination

$199 ThousandEmployment: Pregnancy Discrimination

$195 ThousandEmployment: Religious Discrimination

$193 ThousandEmployment: Failure to Accommodate

$180 ThousandEmployment: Unpaid Wages

$175 ThousandEmployment: Pregnancy Discrimination

$175 ThousandEmployment: Whistleblower Retaliation

$175 ThousandEmployment: Medical Leave Retaliation

$174 ThousandEmployment: Wage and Hour

$167 ThousandEmployment: Wage and Hour

$160 ThousandEmployment: Unpaid Wages

$158 ThousandBreach of Contract

$150 ThousandEmployment: Reverse Race Discrimination

$130 ThousandEmployment: Race Discrimination

$125 ThousandEmployment: Wrongful Termination

$125 ThousandEmployment: Sexual Harassment

$125 ThousandEmployment: Disability Discrimination

$125 ThousandEmployment: Medical Leave Retaliation

$120 ThousandEmployment: Unpaid Commission Wages

$120 ThousandEmployment: Retaliation

$120 ThousandPersonal Injury: Automobile Collision

$107 ThousandEmployment: Whistleblower Retaliation

$100 ThousandEmployment: Religious Discrimination

$100 ThousandEmployment: Failure to Accommodate

$100 ThousandEmployment: Wrongful Termination

$100 ThousandPersonal Injury: Bicycle Collision

$100 ThousandPersonal Injury: Pedestrian Collision

MORE RESULTS