Best Sexual Harassment Lawyer in Bakersfield

When facing the distressing reality of sexual harassment in the workplace, it’s essential to have a trusted and experienced attorney by your side. Akopyan Law Firm, A.P.C. stands out as the best sexual harassment lawyer in Bakersfield, California, providing dedicated legal support to victims seeking justice. Our firm is committed to ensuring that the rights of our clients are upheld, and that those responsible for harassment are held accountable.

Understanding sexual harassment is crucial, especially when it comes to legal claims. The law requires that the harassment must be “severe or pervasive” to be actionable, and this standard is often a focal point in these cases. At Akopyan Law Firm, A.P.C., we have the experience needed to navigate this complex legal landscape, making us the best sexual harassment attorney in Bakersfield.

The Requirement of “Severe and Pervasive”

One of the most challenging aspects of proving a sexual harassment claim is meeting the legal requirement that the harassment was “severe or pervasive.” This standard is derived from both federal and state laws and serves as a threshold to determine whether the behavior in question rises to the level of unlawful harassment.

The term “severe” refers to the intensity or seriousness of the harassment. For instance, a single incident of physical assault or an egregious act of verbal abuse might be considered severe enough to meet this standard. On the other hand, “pervasive” refers to the frequency or pervasiveness of the harassment. A pattern of frequent, inappropriate comments, advances, or gestures can create a hostile work environment even if no single act is particularly severe.

In some cases, the harassment might not be severe but could still be actionable if it is pervasive. For example, repeated unwelcome sexual comments or jokes, even if they seem minor on their own, can create a toxic work environment over time. Conversely, a single severe act, such as a sexual assault, may be sufficient to meet the standard without the need for repeated incidents.

At Akopyan Law Firm, A.P.C., we understand that every case is unique. We meticulously examine the details of each case to determine how best to demonstrate that the harassment was either severe, pervasive, or both. Our expertise in handling these complexities makes us the best sexual harassment lawyer in Bakersfield, capable of building a strong case on behalf of our clients.

Legal Protections Under Federal and State Laws

Sexual violation in the workplace is prohibited under both federal and California state laws. Understanding these legal frameworks is essential for anyone considering legal action against an employer or colleague.

Federal Law: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is the primary federal law that protects employees from unwanted sexual advances and quid pro quo harassment. This law applies to employers with 15 or more employees and prohibits discrimination based on sex, which includes sexual harassment. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) enforces Title VII and provides a process for victims to file complaints and seek redress.

Under Title VII, both severe and pervasive harassment can constitute a violation of the law. The EEOC investigates claims and can pursue legal action against employers who fail to address or prevent harassment in the workplace.

California State Law: Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA)

In addition to federal protections, California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) offers even broader protections. FEHA applies to employers with five or more employees and mandates that all employees, including supervisors, receive training on sexual harassment prevention.

FEHA recognizes both severe and pervasive harassment as grounds for legal action. Victims can file a complaint with the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH), which has the authority to investigate and prosecute violations of the law. Remedies under FEHA can include compensatory damages, reinstatement, and punitive damages, among others.

Akopyan Law Firm, A.P.C. is recognized as the best sexual misconduct law firm in Bakersfield due to our deep understanding of these laws and our commitment to advocating for our clients. We are dedicated to ensuring that victims of unwanted sexual advances receive the justice and compensation they deserve.

Why Choose Akopyan Law Firm, A.P.C.?

Choosing the right legal representation is critical when dealing with sexual harassment in the workplace. Akopyan Law Firm, A.P.C. is known for being the best sexual harassment attorney near me, offering personalized and effective legal services tailored to each client’s needs.

Our firm is dedicated to protecting the rights of our clients and ensuring that they receive the full protections provided by the law. Whether you are facing severe or pervasive harassment, we have the expertise and determination to guide you through the legal process and achieve the best possible outcome.

If you or someone you know is experiencing sexual harassment at work, don’t hesitate to contact Akopyan Law Firm, A.P.C. We are here to help you navigate this difficult time and ensure that your rights are upheld. Reach out to us today to schedule a consultation with a Bakersfield sexual harassment lawyer who will fight for you.

Best Sexual Harassment Law Firm in Bakersfield

If you have been sexually harassed in the workplace, call us today at (661) 874-4118 or contact us online to schedule a free case evaluation. Our battle tested sexual harassment lawyers in Bakersfield stand ready to help in cases involving sexual harassment in the workplace.

Featured Sexual Harassment Case

Hughes v. Pair, 46 Cal. 4th 1035, 209 P.3d 963 (2009)The former wife of a decedent brought action against trustee of decedent’s estate, alleging sexual harassment under state civil rights statute prohibiting sexual harassment by person engaged in designated business, service, or professional relationship, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Superior Court, Los Angeles County, No. BC338385, Andria K. Richey, J., granted trustee summary judgment. Wife appealed. The Court of Appeal affirmed. Wife petitioned for review. The Supreme Court granted review, superseding the opinion of the Court of Appeal.  The Supreme Court, Kennard, J., held that: 1 trustee’s alleged acts were not “pervasive”; 2 trustee’s alleged acts were not “severe”; 3 trustee did not commit “quid pro quo sexual harassment”; 4 trustee’s conduct was not extreme or outrageous; 5 former wife did not experience severe emotional distress.

In relevant part, the Court’s opinion states as follows:

Enacted in 1964, Title VII (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.) defines as “an unlawful employment practice” discrimination by an employer based on an applicant’s or employee’s “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” (42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1), italics added.) The prohibition covers employment decisions and conduct affecting “compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” (Ibid.)
3 An employer violates Title VII by refusing to hire or promote someone solely because of that person’s gender. (Automobile Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc. (1991) 499 U.S. 187, 197, 111 S.Ct. 1196, 113 L.Ed.2d 158.) Such conduct is sex discrimination. (Ibid.)
4 Title VII treats sexual harassment as another form of sex discrimination. (Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson (1986) 477 U.S. 57, 64, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (Meritor ).) Just as an employee who is subjected to the loss of some “ ‘economic’ or ‘tangible’ ” job benefit as the result of sex discrimination can sue under Title VII (Meritor, supra, at p. 64, 106 S.Ct. 2399), so can an employee who is **970 subjected to “ ‘ [u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature’ ” (id. at p. 65, 106 S.Ct. 2399). As the high court explained in Meritor: “ ‘Sexual harassment which creates a hostile or offensive environment for members of one sex is every bit the arbitrary barrier to sexual equality at the workplace that racial harassment *1042 is to racial equality. Surely, a requirement that a man or woman run a gauntlet of sexual abuse in return for the privilege of being allowed to work and make a living can be as demeaning and disconcerting as the harshest of racial epithets.’ ” (Id. at p. 67, 106 S.Ct. 2399.)
5 Federal law recognizes two forms of sexual harassment. One is a demand for sexual favors in return for a job benefit; this is known as “quid pro quo harassment.” (Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth (1998) 524 U.S. 742, 752, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (Ellerth ).) The other is sexually harassing conduct that, although not resulting in the loss of or denial of any job benefit, is so “severe or pervasive” as to create a hostile work environment. (Id. at p. 752, 118 S.Ct. 2257.) The terms “quid pro quo” and “hostile work environment” are not in Title VII’s text; they first turned up in academic literature, found their way into federal appellate decisions, and after their mention ***644 by the high court in Meritor, supra, 477 U.S. 57, 106 S.Ct. 2399, “acquired their own [legal] significance.” (Ellerth, supra, at p. 752, 118 S.Ct. 2257.)
678 Under Title VII, sexual harassment is considered “severe or pervasive” only when it “ ‘ “alter[s] the conditions of [the victim’s] employment and create[s] an abusive working environment.” ’ ” (Clark County School Dist. v. Breeden (2001) 532 U.S. 268, 270, 121 S.Ct. 1508, 149 L.Ed.2d 509.) Taken into account must be the surrounding circumstances, such as the “ ‘ “frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.” ’ ” (Id. at pp. 270–271, 121 S.Ct. 1508.) Thus, “ ‘simple teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory changes’ ” in employment conditions. (Id. at p. 271, 121 S.Ct. 1508; see also Faragher v. Boca Raton (1998) 524 U.S. 775, 787–788, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 141 L.Ed.2d 662.)
B. California Law
Like federal law, California law prohibits sexual harassment in the workplace. Originally enacted in 1980, Government Code section 12940 is part of the FEHA. (See Gov.Code, § 12900 et seq.) It defines “an unlawful employment practice” as an employer’s refusal to hire, employ, or select for a training program leading to employment, any person because of that person’s “race, religious creed, color, national origin, ancestry, physical disability, mental disability, medical condition, marital status, sex, age, or sexual orientation.” (Gov.Code, § 12940, subd. (a), italics added.) Since 1985, the FEHA has prohibited sexual harassment of an employee. (See Gov.Code, § 12940, subd. (j)(1).)
910 With respect to sexual harassment in the workplace (see Gov.Code, § 12940, subd. (j)(4)(C)), the prohibited conduct ranges from expressly or *1043 impliedly conditioning employment benefits on submission to, or tolerance of, unwelcome sexual advances to the creation of a work environment that is “hostile or abusive to employees because of their sex.” (Miller v. Department of Corrections (2005) 36 Cal.4th 446, 462, 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 797, 115 P.3d 77 (Miller ).) Thus, similar to the federal law’s Title VII, California’s FEHA “recognize[s] two theories of liability for sexual harassment claims … ‘… quid pro quo harassment, where a term of employment is conditioned upon submission to unwelcome sexual advances … [and] hostile work environment, where the harassment is sufficiently pervasive so as to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive work environment.’ ” (Herberg v. California Institute of the Arts (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 142, 149, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 (Herberg ); accord, Miller, supra, at pp. 461–462, 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 797, 115 P.3d 77.)
Although there are some differences in the wording of the federal law’s Title VII and California’s FEHA, these laws share the **971 same antidiscriminatory goals and serve the same public policies. (Lyle, supra, 38 Cal.4th 264, 278, 42 Cal.Rptr.3d 2, 132 P.3d 211.)
1112 In construing California’s FEHA, this court has held that the hostile work environment form of sexual harassment is actionable only when the harassing behavior is pervasive or severe. (Miller, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 462, 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 797, 115 P.3d 77.) This limitation mirrors the federal courts’ interpretation of Title VII. (Miller, at p. 462, 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 797, 115 P.3d 77.) To prevail on a hostile work environment claim under California’s FEHA, an employee must show that the ***645 harassing conduct was “severe enough or sufficiently pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create a work environment that qualifies as hostile or abusive to employees because of their sex.” (Miller, supra, at p. 462, 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 797, 115 P.3d 77; see Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 121, 130, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 132, 980 P.2d 846.) There is no recovery “for harassment that is occasional, isolated, sporadic, or trivial.” (Lyle, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 283, 42 Cal.Rptr.3d 2, 132 P.3d 211.)
13 Courts that have construed federal and California employment discrimination laws have held that an employee seeking to prove sexual harassment based on no more than a few isolated incidents of harassing conduct must show that the conduct was “severe in the extreme.” (Herberg, supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 151, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 1; accord, Lyle, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 284, 42 Cal.Rptr.3d 2, 132 P.3d 211, citing Herberg with approval; see Candelore v. Clark County Sanitation Dist. (9th Cir.1992) 975 F.2d 588, 590 [isolated incidents of sexual horseplay over number of years held insufficient]; Saxton v. American Tel. & Tel. Co. (7th Cir.1993) 10 F.3d 526, 528, 534–535 [summary judgment for defendant upheld where defendant rubbed and kissed plaintiff on one occasion and groped her on another].) A single harassing incident involving “physical violence or the threat thereof” may qualify as being severe in the extreme. (Herberg, supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 151, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 1; accord, Lyle, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 284, 42 Cal.Rptr.3d 2, 132 P.3d 211.)
1415 *1044 Under California’s FEHA, as under the federal law’s Title VII, the existence of a hostile work environment depends upon “the totality of the circumstances.” (Miller, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 462, 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 797, 115 P.3d 77.) We said in Lyle, supra, 38 Cal.4th at page 284, 42 Cal.Rptr.3d 2, 132 P.3d 211, that “[t]o be actionable, ‘a sexually objectionable environment must be both objectively and subjectively offensive.’ ” Therefore, “a plaintiff who subjectively perceives the workplace as hostile or abusive will not prevail … if a reasonable person … considering all the circumstances, would not share the same perception.” (Ibid.)

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