Employment Lawyers in Riverside, California

The Akopyan Law Firm A.P.C. stands ready to provide first rate legal services and representation and protect the rights and interests of both employees and employers in the City of Riverside.

City of Riverside

The City of Riverside is located in Riverside County, in the State of California. The City of Riverside was founded by a group of Easterners back in 1870.  The city was built on land that was once a Spanish rancho. The first orange trees were planted in 1871, but the citrus industry in Riverside began two years later when Eliza Tibbets received two Brazilian navel orange trees sent to her by a friend at the Department of Agriculture in Washington. The trees thrived in the Southern California climate and the navel orange industry grew rapidly. Within a few years, the successful cultivation of the newly discovered navel orange led to the establishment of the citrus industry. By 1882, there were more than half a million citrus trees in California, almost half of which were in Riverside. As the city prospered, a small guest hotel designed in the popular Mission Revival style grew to become the world famous Mission Inn, favored by presidents, royalty and movie stars. Postcards of lush orange groves, swimming pools. and magnificent homes have attracted vacationers and entrepreneurs throughout the years. Many relocated to the warm, dry climate for reasons of health and to escape Eastern winters. Victoria Avenue with its landmark homes serves as a reminder of European investors who settled here.  Riverside’s citizens are proud of the city’s unique character born from a tradition of careful planning.  Riverside is home to many large employers including Kaiser Permanente, Riverside Community Hospital, and Cal Baptist University.  As of 2021, the population of Riverside was 317,261.  The City covers the following zip codes: 92501, 92502, 92503, 92504, 92505, 92506, 92507, 92508, 92509, 92513, 92514, 92515, 92516, 92517, 92518, and 92519.

Skilled Labor Lawyers Working Out of Riverside California

The Akopyan Law Firm A.P.C. has offices in Los Angeles, Bakersfield, Oxnard, Temecula, Rancho Cucamonga, Costa Mesa, Culver City, and San Diego.  We provide legal services to employees and employers throughout the County of Riverside.

Employment Lawyer – Riverside, California

The relationship between employees and employers in the City of Riverside is governed by a number of laws, some of which are local, while others come from the State of California, and others still are federal. Some of the state laws that apply to the employment relationship in the City of Riverside include, but are not limited to the California Labor Code, the California Government Code, the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), California Constitution, the California Family Rights Act, and the California Business & Professions Code.  Some of the United States laws governing the workplace in the City of Riverside, California include but are not limited to the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Family and Medical Leave Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the National Labor Relations Act, the Labor Management Relations Act, and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act.

Many folks in Riverside may have their rights violated without even realizing that it is happening.  Similarly, employers in Riverside can break the law and unwittingly end up in hot water.  If you live or work in Riverside and believe that you may have been harassed, discriminated against, or retaliated against don’t just sit there and wonder “are there any Riverside labor law attorneys near me I can call” or “are there any employment lawyers in Riverside me who can help?”  The fastest way to determine if your rights have been violated is to call one of our Riverside labor lawyers for a free evaluation.  At the Akopyan Law Firm, our Riverside attorneys will listen with compassion and fight with passion to defend your rights. If you are looking for an employment attorney in Riverside give us a call and see what we can do to help you.  Our firm has a 97% success rate, and decades of experience. Let us put our experience to work for you.

Riverside Labor Lawyers Ready to Help

If you are in Riverside, finding the best employment attorney for your case may not be as easy as it may seem.  Without a doubt residents of the City of Riverside have many choices available to them, but a Google search for “Riverside employment lawyer” may not be the best way to find the best Riverside lawyer. It can be tough to find the right attorney with the proper skill and experience.  Finding an attorney well versed in this area of the law, and experienced in handling such disputes can be hard.  Folks can try to find a labor lawyer by running online searches for “Riverside employment lawyer” or “labor lawyer in Riverside” but fancy websites and huge advertising budgets do not necessarily lead to great lawyers.  If you wish to speak directly with an employment lawyer in Riverside, California, contact the Akopyan Law Firm and speak to one of our employment lawyers at our Riverside office.  Each of our lawyers has well over a decade of experience in employment law and is ready to speak with you directly about your specific situation.

Employment Lawyer Riverside

Employers and employees in Riverside who are seeking the best employment attorney in Riverside for their case should find a local attorney who specializes in employment law.  Our skilled Riverside labor law attorneys devote the vast and overwhelming majority of their time to protecting employees from injustice.  Most of our caseload consists of employment cases representing employees against their current or former employers.  We also represent local mom and pop businesses. Our Riverside employment lawyers are ready to help with cases involving discrimination, including, but not limited to, age, sex, and race discrimination, emotional distress, retaliation, wrongful termination, and many other forms of illegal conduct in the workplace. Our employment lawyers have a track record of success.

Finding The Right Riverside Labor Lawyer

Finding the right labor lawyer in Riverside County is not always easy.  One can try running online searches for things like “labor attorneys near me” or “employee attorney near me” or “employee lawyer near me” but a random online search may not establish contact with the right lawyer for the specific case.  There are many different firms out there, but the approach of each firm varies significantly.  Not every employee attorney in Riverside will be a good fit for every case. The goal of our Riverside labor lawyers is to achieve the best possible outcome for each client regardless of how big of a fight it would take to get there.  We are proud of the first class service we provide, but we don’t take our word for it – See what our clients have to say!  The relationships we build with our clients often outlast the life of the case.  Our Riverside employment lawyers fight passionately for our clients as confirmed by the excellent results they have achieved. If you are looking for employment lawyers in Riverside call us today for a free evaluation.

We Can Help Riverside Residents with Cases Involving:

Age Discrimination

Constructive Discharge

Disability Discrimination

Employee Misclassification

Family Medical Leave

Meal and Rest Breaks

Minimum Wage

Overtime Compensation

Paid Sick Time Off

Pregnancy Disability Leave

Pregnancy Discrimination

Race Discrimination

Reasonable Accommodation for Disability

Religious Discrimination

Unlawful Retaliation

Sex or Gender Discrimination

Sexual Assault

Sexual Harassment

Tips and Gratuities

Unpaid Wages

Whistleblower Retaliation

Wrongful Termination

Featured Articles:

  • tylized illustration of two anonymous hands interacting with a holographic case file tracking accommodation steps.

Wrongful Termination vs. Lawful Discharge After Bodily Injury in California

📌 Key Takeaways Find out whether a post-injury firing crossed the line by focusing on motive, process, and what the law actually protects. FEHA Sets the Guardrails: California law forbids disability discrimination in private-sector employment (Gov. Code §12940(a)) and often provides broader protection than the ADA. Process Is Evidence: Employers have duties to consider reasonable accommodation and engage in a good-faith interactive process (§§12940(m), (n)), and skipping these steps is a red flag. Timing Alone Is Not Conclusive: Temporal proximity between injury disclosure and termination can be important, but outcomes turn on the totality of circumstances—not a single date on the calendar. Lawful Reasons Are Narrow: A discharge can be lawful when it stems from bona fide business reasons, a genuine undue hardship, or the inability to perform essential functions even with accommodation. Think Before You Quit: Constructive-discharge claims carry a high threshold, and resigning can negatively affect income... Read more

  • Stylized illustration of two anonymous figures in a calm meeting with medical note, checklist, and calendar icons.

Interactive Process Violations in California: Recognizing Possible Employer Violations After Bodily Injuries

📌 Key Takeaways Know the signs of an illegal response when your employer learns about your disabilities due to bodily injuries. Silence Is a Signal: Your employer’s failure to engage in a timely conversation after you disclose a disability can be a direct violation of their legal duty. Good Faith Isn’t Optional: A brief, dismissive meeting or a quick “no” without exploring alternatives fails the legal requirement for a genuine, good-faith dialogue. Policies Don’t Invalidate People: A company's blanket statement like “we don’t offer light duty” is not a valid substitute for an individualized assessment of your specific needs. A Request for an Accommodation Is Protected Activity: Any punitive action, like sudden poor reviews or suspensions following your request for an accommodation for your disability, can be considered illegal retaliation.  Recognizing these patterns is the first step in protecting your rights. These insights are for any California employee in... Read more

  • Anonymous worker and manager seated at a table pointing to illuminated accommodation-option tiles.

Denied Workplace Accommodations After Bodily Injury? California Employers Have Specific Obligations

📌 Key Takeaways Denied or ignored after a bodily injury? California law sets clear rules for how employers must handle disability accommodations and the patterns that expose noncompliance. FEHA Sets the Baseline: Covered employers (5+ employees) must engage in a good-faith interactive process to identify reasonable accommodations for a disability, and once the accommodation is identified, it must be provided. Disability Definition Is Broad: Injury-related physical limitations, including temporary and non–work-related impairments, can qualify as disabilities in California, triggering accommodation obligations. Accommodations Must Be Considered: Effective options can include modified duties, schedule changes, assistive equipment, finite medical leave, or reassignment to a vacant role—the governing standard is effectiveness, not convenience. Only Narrow Grounds Justify Denial: An accommodation request can be denied based on an undue hardship, the employee’s inability to perform essential functions even with accommodation, or a supported direct threat analysis based on individualized, objective evidence. Know the... Read more

Featured Employment Case

Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 575 U.S. 206 (2015)
The Pregnancy Discrimination Act added new language to the definitions subsection of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The first clause of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act specifies that Title VII’s prohibition against sex discrimination applies to discrimination “because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or **1341 related medical conditions.” 42 U.S. C § 2000e(k). The Act’s second clause says that employers must treat “women affected by pregnancy … the same for all employment-related purposes … as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work.” Ibid. This case asks the Court to determine how the latter provision applies in the context of an employer’s policy that accommodates many, but not all, workers with nonpregnancy-related disabilities.  Petitioner Young was a part-time driver for respondent United Parcel Service (UPS). When she became pregnant, her doctor advised her that she should not lift more than 20 pounds. UPS, however, required drivers like Young to be able to lift up to 70 pounds. UPS told Young that she could not work while under a lifting restriction. Young subsequently filed this federal lawsuit, claiming that UPS acted unlawfully in refusing to accommodate her pregnancy-related lifting restriction. She brought only a disparate-treatment claim of discrimination, which a plaintiff can prove either by direct evidence that a workplace policy, practice, or decision relies expressly on a protected characteristic, or by using the burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668. Under that framework, the plaintiff has “the initial burden” of “establishing a prima facie case” of discrimination. Id., at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817. If she carries her burden, the employer must have an opportunity “to articulate some legitimate, non-discriminatory reason[s] for” the difference in treatment. Ibid. If the employer articulates such reasons, the plaintiff then has “an opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the reasons … were a pretext for discrimination.” Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207. After discovery, UPS sought summary judgment. In reply, Young presented several favorable facts that she believed she could prove. In particular, she pointed to UPS policies that accommodated workers who *207 were injured on the job, had disabilities covered by the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), or had lost Department of Transportation (DOT) certifications. Pursuant to these policies, Young contended, UPS had accommodated several individuals whose disabilities created work restrictions similar to hers. She argued that these policies showed that UPS discriminated against its pregnant employees because it had a light-duty-for-injury policy for numerous “other persons,” but not for pregnant workers. UPS responded that, since Young did not fall within the on-the-job injury, ADA, or DOT categories, it had not discriminated against Young on the basis of pregnancy, but had treated her just as it treated all “other” relevant “persons.” The District Court granted UPS summary judgment, concluding, inter alia, that Young could not make out a prima facie case of discrimination under McDonnell Douglas. The court found that those with whom Young had compared herself—those falling within the on-the-job, DOT, or ADA categories—were too different to qualify as “similarly situated comparator[s].” The Fourth Circuit affirmed.
The Supreme Court held as follows:
An individual pregnant worker who seeks to show disparate treatment through indirect evidence may do so through application of the McDonnell Douglas framework.
(a) The parties’ interpretations of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act’s second clause are unpersuasive.
(i) Young claims that as long as “an employer accommodates only a subset of **1342 workers with disabling conditions,” “pregnant workers who are similar in the ability to work [must] receive the same treatment even if still other nonpregnant workers do not receive accommodations.” Brief for Petitioner 28. Her reading proves too much. The Court doubts that Congress intended to grant pregnant workers an unconditional “most-favored-nation” status, such that employers who provide one or two workers with an accommodation must provide similar accommodations to all pregnant workers, irrespective of any other criteria. After all, the second clause of the Act, when referring to nonpregnant persons with similar disabilities, uses the open-ended term “other persons.” It does not say that the employer must treat pregnant employees the “same” as “any other persons” who are similar in their ability or inability to work, nor does it specify the particular “other persons” Congress had in mind as appropriate comparators for pregnant workers. Moreover, disparate-treatment law normally allows an employer to implement policies that are not intended to harm members of a protected class, even if their implementation sometimes harms those members, as long as the employer has a legitimate, nondiscriminatory, nonpretextual *208 reason for doing so. See, e.g., Burdine, supra, at 252–258, 101 S.Ct. 1089. There is no reason to think Congress intended its language in the Pregnancy Discrimination Act to deviate from that approach.
(ii) The Solicitor General argues that the Court should give special, if not controlling, weight to a 2014 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission guideline concerning the application of Title VII and the ADA to pregnant employees. But that guideline lacks the timing, “consistency,” and “thoroughness” of “consideration” necessary to “give it power to persuade.” Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140, 65 S.Ct. 161, 89 L.Ed. 124. The guideline was promulgated after certiorari was granted here; it takes a position on which previous EEOC guidelines were silent; it is inconsistent with positions long advocated by the Government; and the EEOC does not explain the basis for its latest guidance.
(iii) UPS claims that the Act’s second clause simply defines sex discrimination to include pregnancy discrimination. But that cannot be right, as the first clause of the Act accomplishes that objective. Reading the Act’s second clause as UPS proposes would thus render the first clause superfluous. It would also fail to carry out a key congressional objective in passing the Act. The Act was intended to overturn the holding and the reasoning of General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 97 S.Ct. 401, 50 L.Ed.2d 343, which upheld against a Title VII challenge a company plan that provided nonoccupational sickness and accident benefits to all employees but did not provide disability-benefit payments for any absence due to pregnancy.
(b) An individual pregnant worker who seeks to show disparate treatment may make out a prima facie case under the McDonnell Douglas framework by showing that she belongs to the protected class, that she sought accommodation, that the employer did not accommodate her, and that the employer did accommodate others “similar in their ability or inability to work.” The employer may then seek to justify its refusal to accommodate the plaintiff by relying on “legitimate, nondiscriminatory” reasons for denying accommodation. That reason normally cannot consist simply of a claim that it is more expensive or less convenient to add pregnant women to the category of those whom the employer accommodates. If the employer offers a “legitimate, nondiscriminatory” reason, the plaintiff may show that it **1343 is in fact pretextual. The plaintiff may reach a jury on this issue by providing sufficient evidence that the employer’s policies impose a significant burden on pregnant workers, and that the employer’s “legitimate, nondiscriminatory” reasons are not sufficiently strong to justify the burden, but rather—when considered along with the burden imposed—give rise to an inference of intentional discrimination. The plaintiff can create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether a significant burden exists by providing *209 evidence that the employer accommodates a large percentage of nonpregnant workers while failing to accommodate a large percentage of pregnant workers. This approach is consistent with the longstanding rule that a plaintiff can use circumstantial proof to rebut an employer’s apparently legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons, see Burdine, supra, at 255, n. 10, 101 S.Ct. 1089, and with Congress’ intent to overrule Gilbert.
2. Under this interpretation of the Act, the Fourth Circuit’s judgment must be vacated. Summary judgment is appropriate when there is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact.” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56(a). The record here shows that Young created a genuine dispute as to whether UPS provided more favorable treatment to at least some employees whose situation cannot reasonably be distinguished from hers. It is left to the Fourth Circuit to determine on remand whether Young also created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether UPS’ reasons for having treated Young less favorably than these other nonpregnant employees were pretextual.

 

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Millions of Dollars Recovered For Our Clients

Check Out Our Case Results

$6.131 MillionEmployment: Disability Discrimination
$3.85 MillionEmployment: Wrongful Termination
$950 ThousandEmployment: Retaliation
$800 ThousandEmployment: Sexual Harassment
$750 ThousandEmployment: Sexual Harassment
$700 ThousandEmployment: Wrongful Termination / Race Discrimination
$658 ThousandEmployment: Sexual Harassment
$650 ThousandPersonal Injury: Automobile Collision
$400 ThousandEmployment: Constructive Termination
$375 ThousandEmployment: Sexual Harassment
$325 ThousandEmployment: Sexual Harassment
$300 ThousandEmployment: Wrongful Termination / Race Discrimination
$295 ThousandEmployment: Wage and Hour
$265 ThousandEmployment: Sexual Harassment
$250 ThousandEmployment: Whistleblower Retaliation
$250 ThousandEmployment: Pregnancy Discrimination
$250 ThousandEmployment Law: Disability Discrimination
$240 ThousandEmployment: Disability Discrimination
$240 ThousandEmployment: Sexual Harassment
$210 ThousandEmployment: Family Leave Retaliation
$200 ThousandEmployment: Wrongful Termination
$199 ThousandEmployment: Pregnancy Discrimination
$195 ThousandEmployment: Religious Discrimination
$193 ThousandEmployment: Failure to Accommodate
$180 ThousandEmployment: Unpaid Wages
$175 ThousandEmployment: Pregnancy Discrimination
$175 ThousandEmployment: Whistleblower Retaliation
$175 ThousandEmployment: Medical Leave Retaliation
$174 ThousandEmployment: Wage and Hour
$167 ThousandEmployment: Wage and Hour
$165 ThousandEmployment: Wage & Hour Violations
$160 ThousandEmployment: Unpaid Wages
$158 ThousandBreach of Contract
$150 ThousandEmployment: Reverse Race Discrimination
$130 ThousandEmployment: Race Discrimination
$125 ThousandEmployment: Sexual Harassment
$125 ThousandEmployment: Wrongful Termination
$125 ThousandEmployment: Sexual Harassment
$125 ThousandEmployment: Disability Discrimination
$125 ThousandEmployment: Medical Leave Retaliation
$120 ThousandEmployment: Unpaid Commission Wages
$120 ThousandEmployment: Retaliation
$120 ThousandPersonal Injury: Automobile Collision
$107 ThousandEmployment: Whistleblower Retaliation
$100 ThousandEmployment: Associational Disability Discrimination
$100 ThousandEmployment: Religious Discrimination
$100 ThousandEmployment: Failure to Accommodate
$100 ThousandEmployment: Wrongful Termination
$100 ThousandPersonal Injury: Bicycle Collision
$100 ThousandPersonal Injury: Pedestrian Collision
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