Best Sexual Harassment Lawyers in Orange, California
Sexual harassment in the workplace is a serious issue that affects countless employees across various industries. If you’re facing this challenging situation, it’s essential to have the right legal support. Akopyan Law Firm, A.P.C. is dedicated to providing top-tier legal representation for victims of workplace harassment. Our firm is widely recognized as the best sexual harassment lawyer in Orange, California, and we are committed to helping our clients secure justice and regain their sense of security.
Our reputation as the best sexual harassment law firm in Orange is built on years of experience, a deep understanding of employment law, and an unwavering dedication to our clients. Every case is handled with the utmost care and precision, ensuring that our clients receive the legal support they need to move forward with confidence.
Legal Protections Against Sexual Harassment
Understanding the legal framework that protects you from sexual misconduct and coercion is crucial when taking action. Both federal and California state laws provide extensive protections designed to create safe and respectful work environments.
Federal Protections: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
On a federal level, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is the primary law that addresses sexual harassment in the workplace. This law, enforced by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), prohibits employers from engaging in or tolerating sexual violation. Title VII applies to employers with a certain number of employees and provides a pathway for victims to file complaints and seek redress.
The EEOC offers guidelines on identifying sexual harassment and outlines the process for filing a complaint. As an Orange sexual assault lawyer, Akopyan Law Firm, A.P.C. helps clients ensuring they fully understand their rights and the steps involved in pursuing a claim.
California State Protections: Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA)
California law offers even broader protections through the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). FEHA not only covers a wider range of employers, with the law applying to any business with five or more employees, but it also mandates sexual abuse training to prevent such incidents from occurring.
Victims in California can file complaints with the California Civil Rights Department (CRD), which has the authority to investigate and take legal action against employers who violate the law. FEHA also provides for a range of remedies, including compensatory and punitive damages.
As the best sexual harassment attorney in Orange, we are dedicated to ensuring that our clients receive the full protections afforded under California law. We keep up-to-date with the latest legal changes to offer the most effective representation possible.
Recent Amendments to California Law
California continues to strengthen its stance against sexual harassment through recent legislative changes. One of the key amendments is the extension of the statute of limitations for filing a sexual abuse claim with the CRD. Victims now have three years, instead of just one, to file a claim, giving them more time to take action.
Another critical change is the restriction on confidentiality clauses in settlement agreements for sexual harassment cases. This means that victims are no longer forced to keep silent about their cases, allowing for greater transparency and preventing repeat offenders from escaping public accountability.
Different Forms of Sexual Harassment
Sexual coercion in the workplace can manifest in several forms, each with its own unique challenges. Understanding these various forms is essential for recognizing harassment and taking appropriate action.
Quid Pro Quo Harassment
Quid pro quo harassment occurs when employment decisions, such as hiring, promotions, or job assignments, are contingent upon an employee’s submission to unwelcome sexual advances or requests. This form of harassment often involves a power dynamic, where a supervisor or someone in a position of authority uses their influence to coerce an employee.
For example, a supervisor might imply that an employee must engage in a sexual relationship to secure a raise or avoid a negative performance review. As the best sexual harassment attorney near me, Akopyan Law Firm, A.P.C. has extensive experience in handling quid pro quo cases, ensuring that your rights are protected and that you receive fair treatment.
Hostile Work Environment
A hostile work environment is created when unwelcome sexual conduct or remarks are pervasive or severe enough to affect an employee’s ability to perform their job. This can include inappropriate comments, jokes, or gestures, unwanted physical contact, or even the display of sexually explicit materials in the workplace.
The key to a hostile work environment claim is proving that the harassment was either frequent or severe enough to make the workplace intimidating or offensive. As the best sexual harassment law firm in Orange, we work closely with our clients to gather evidence, document incidents, and build a strong case that clearly demonstrates how the harassment has affected their work life.
Sexual Favoritism
Sexual favoritism occurs when an employee who engages in a consensual sexual relationship with a superior receives preferential treatment, such as promotions, raises, or more desirable assignments, to the detriment of other employees. Even though the relationship may be consensual, the resulting favoritism can create a discriminatory work environment for those who are not engaged in the relationship.
At Akopyan Law Firm, A.P.C., we understand the complexities of sexual favoritism cases. As an Orange sexual harassment lawyer, we are committed to ensuring that all employees are treated fairly and that workplace promotions and opportunities are based on merit, not personal relationships.
Third-Party Harassment
Sexual harassment isn’t always committed by fellow employees or supervisors. In some cases, harassment can come from third parties. Employers have a legal responsibility to protect their employees from such harassment and must take immediate and appropriate action when it occurs.
As the best sexual harassment lawyer near me, Akopyan Law Firm, A.P.C. takes these cases seriously. We work to hold employers accountable for ensuring a safe work environment, regardless of the source of harassment.
Why Choose Akopyan Law Firm, A.P.C.?
When you’re facing unwanted sexual advances, choosing the right legal representation can make all the difference. Akopyan Law Firm, A.P.C. is widely recognized as the best sexual harassment lawyer in Orange for a reason. Our client-focused approach ensures that we listen carefully to your story, understand your unique needs, and develop a personalized legal strategy that gives you the best chance of success.
We are committed to fighting for justice on your behalf, whether you’re dealing with quid pro quo harassment, a hostile work environment, or another form of workplace harassment. Our extensive experience and deep knowledge of both federal and state laws enable us to provide the highest level of legal support.
If you’re searching for the best sexual harassment attorney in Orange, or the best sexual harassment attorney near me, look no further than Akopyan Law Firm, A.P.C. We invite you to contact us today to schedule a consultation. Let us help you take the first steps toward justice and a safer, more respectful work environment.
Areas Served
The sexual harassment lawyers of the Akopyan Law Firm, A.P.C. serve all of Southern California including but not limited to Adelanto, Agoura Hills, Alhambra, Aliso Viejo, Altadena, Anaheim, Apple Valley, Arcadia, Arleta, Atwater Village, Azuza, Bakersfield, Baldwin Park, Banning, Beaumont, Bell, Bell Gardens, Bellflower, Beverly Hills, Blythe, Boyle Heights, Brea, Brentwood, Buena Park, Burbank, Calabasas, Calimesa, Camarillo, Canoga Park, Canyon Lake, Carson, Cathedral City, Cerritos, Chatsworth, Chino Hills, Chino, Claremont, Coachella, Colton, Compton, Costa Mesa, Corona, Covina, Culver City, Cypress, Dana Point, Desert Hot Springs, Diamond Bar, Downey, Duarte, Eagle Rock, East Hollywood, East Los Angeles, Eastvale, Echo Park, El Monte, El Segundo, El Sereno, Encino, Fontana, Fountain Valley, Fullerton, Gardena, Garden Grove, Glassell Park, Glendale, Glendora, Granada Hills, Hacienda Heights, Hawthorne, Hemet, Hesperia, Highland Park, Highland, Hollywood, Hollywood Hills, Huntington Beach, Huntington Park, Indian Wells, Indio, Inglewood, Irvine, Jurupa Valley, La Canada Flintridge, La-Crescenta Montrose, La Habra, La Mirada, La Palma, La Puente, La Quinta, La Verne, Laguna Beach, Laguna Hills, Laguna Niguel, Laguna Woods, Lakewood, Lake Balboa, Lake Elsinore, Lake Forest, Lancaster, Lawndale, Lincoln Heights, Loma Linda, Long Beach, Los Alamitos, Los Angeles, Los Feliz, Lynwood, Manhattan Beach, Mar Vista, Maywood, Menifee, Mission Hills, Mission Viejo, Monrovia, Montclair, Montebello, Monterey Park, Moorpark, Moreno Valley, Murrieta, Newbury Park, Newhall, Newport Beach, Norco, North Hills, North Hollywood, Northridge, Norwalk, Ontario, Orange, Oxnard, Pacific Palisades, Pacoima, Palos Verdes, Palmdale, Palm Desert, Palm Springs, Panorama City, Paramount, Pasadena, Perris, Pico Rivera, Placentia, Pomona, Porter Ranch, Rancho Cucamonga, Rancho Mirage, Rancho Santa Margarita, Redondo Beach, Reseda, Rialto, Riverside, Rosemead, Rowland Heights, San Bernardino, San Clemente, San Dimas, San Gabriel, San Fernando, San Jacinto, San Juan Capistrano, San Pedro, Santa Ana, Santa Clarita, Santa Monica, Sawtelle, Seal Beach, Shadow Hills, Sherman Oaks, Silver Lake, Simi Valley, South El Monte, South Gate, South Pasadena, South Whittier, Stanton, Studio City, Sun Valley, Sunland, Sylmar, Tarzana, Temecula, Temple City, Thousand Oaks, Toluca Lake, Torrance, Tujunga, Tustin, Twentynine Palms, Upland, Valencia, Valley Glen, Valley Village, Van Nuys, Ventura, Victorville, Walnut, West Covina, West Hills, West Hollywood, West Puente Valley, Westchester, Westminster, Westwood, Whittier, Wildomar, Winnetka, Woodland Hills, Yorba Linda
Best Sexual Harassment Law Firm in Orange
If you have been sexually harassed in the workplace, call us today at (657) 224-4422 or contact us online to schedule a free case evaluation. Our battle tested sexual harassment lawyers in Orange stand ready to help in cases involving sexual harassment in the workplace.
Featured Sexual Harassment Case
Okonowsky v. Garland, No. 23-55404, 2024 WL 3530231 (9th Cir. July 25, 2024)
Lindsay Okonowsky, a staff psychologist in a federal prison, discovered that a corrections Lieutenant with whom she worked, and who was responsible for overseeing the safety of guards, prison staff, and inmates in the unit where she worked, operated an Instagram account, which was followed by more than one hundred prison employees. She learned that the Lieutenant had posted sexually offensive content about work, and that she was a personal target. When Okonowsky complained about the page to prison leadership, management told her the page was “funny”; the investigator whom the prison appointed to investigate Okonowsky’s complaint told her the page’s content was not “a problem”; and the Lieutenant began to increasingly target her with his posts in what Okonowsky reasonably perceived to be an effort to intimidate her and discourage her from making further complaints. Two months after Okonowsky first reported the Lieutenant’s behavior, the prison directed the Lieutenant to cease acting in violation of the prison’s Anti-Harassment Policy. The Lieutenant continued posting sexually hostile conduct for another month with no action by the prison. The Lieutenant’s conduct and the prison’s lack of a curative response to it ultimately drove Okonowsky to leave the prison in search of a different job. Okonowsky sued the Bureau of Prisons under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, claiming that the Bureau failed to take adequate measures to address a hostile work environment at the prison. The district court granted the government’s motion for summary judgment, and Okonowsky appealed. The 9th Circuit reversed and remanded. It held that the district court erred by considering only some of the evidence, and by applying incorrect legal standards that circumscribed the law concerning hostile work environment claims. It took the opporuntiy to reaffirm that the totality of the circumstances in a Title VII sexually hostile work environment claim includes evidence of sexually harassing conduct, even if it does not expressly target the plaintiff, as well as evidence of non-sexual conduct directed at the plaintiff that a jury could find retaliatory or intimidating. Italso rejected the notion that only conduct that occurs inside the physical workplace can be actionable, especially in light of the ubiquity of social media and the ready use of it to harass and bully both inside and outside of the physical workplace. the 9th Circuit’s opinion states in part as follows:
“Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employers from discriminating on the basis of sex regarding “compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). To defeat the government’s motion for summary judgment on her hostile work environment claim, Okonowsky must adduce evidence from which a reasonable juror could conclude that (1) she was subjected to a sexually hostile work environment; and (2) the government is liable for the harassment that caused the hostile work environment to exist. See Fried v. Wynn Las Vegas, LLC, 18 F.4th 643, 647 (9th Cir. 2021); Little, 301 F.3d at 966. We address each element in turn.
A. Hostile Work Environment
56To determine whether Okonowsky was subjected to a sexually hostile work environment, we examine three factors: 1) whether Okonowsky was subjected to verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature; 2) whether the conduct was unwelcome; and 3) whether the conduct was “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment.” Fried, 18 F.4th at 647. The third factor requires that Okonowsky “show that her work environment was both subjectively and objectively hostile.” Dominguez-Curry v. Nev. Transp. Dep’t, 424 F.3d 1027, 1034 (9th Cir. 2005). The parties do not dispute that Okonowsky was subjected to unwanted verbal conduct based on her sex, or that Okonowsky subjectively perceived her work environment to be hostile. We thus focus only on part of the third factor—whether Okonowsky adduced evidence of sufficiently severe or pervasive sexually offensive conduct from which a reasonable juror could conclude that Okonowsky’s work environment was objectively hostile from the perspective of a reasonable woman. See Little, 301 F.3d at 966.
78910In analyzing the objective hostility of a working environment, we must look to the totality of the circumstances surrounding the plaintiff’s claim. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 270–71, 121 S.Ct. 1508, 149 L.Ed.2d 509 (2001) (per curiam). That includes assessing the “frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it [was] physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interfere[d] with an employee’s work performance.” Id. (citation omitted). “No single factor” in this non-exhaustive list “is required.” Davis v. Team Elec. Co., 520 F.3d 1080, 1095 (9th Cir. 2008) (alteration omitted) (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993)). Courts also must consider that the “required level of severity or seriousness varies inversely with the pervasiveness or frequency of the conduct,” id. (quoting Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 872 (9th Cir. 2001)), and the cumulative effect of conduct over time, see Zetwick, 850 F.3d at 444; Fried, 18 F.4th at 652; see also Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 532 U.S. at 270, 121 S.Ct. 1508 (“Workplace conduct is not measured in isolation.”). In all cases, “simple teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious)” will not trigger Title VII’s protections. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 778, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 141 L.Ed.2d 662 (1998) (citation omitted).
1. The Totality of the Circumstances
We begin by considering the scope of the evidence relevant to Okonowsky’s claim. The government contends that Okonowsky has failed to establish an objectively hostile work environment because the only relevant conduct at issue—the five Instagram posts identified by the district court—all “occurred entirely outside of the workplace.” This argument is grounded on legally and factually erroneous assumptions.
a. The Physical Workplace
*9 The government relies on our unpublished decision in Fuller v. Idaho Department of Corrections (Fuller II), 694 F. App’x 590, 591 & n.1 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 584 U.S. 904, 138 S.Ct. 1345, 200 L.Ed.2d 514 (2018), to argue that evidence of conduct occurring entirely separate from and unrelated to the workplace cannot, standing alone, suffice to preclude summary judgment in favor of the employer on a hostile work environment claim.6 Whether or not the unprecedential decision in Fuller II stands for that principle, and whether or not that principle is correct, that “principle” has no application to this case.
For one, it makes little sense to describe a social media page that includes overt comments about a specific workplace, like Hellman’s, as “occurring” in only a discrete location, as the district court did below and the government now asserts on appeal. Social media posts are permanently and infinitely viewable and re-viewable by any person with access to the page or site on which the posts appear. No matter where Hellman was or what he was doing when he made his posts, Lompoc employees who followed the page were free to, and did, view, “like,” comment, share, screenshot, print, and otherwise engage with or perceive his abusive posts from anywhere. The Instagram page also served as a record of which co-workers subscribed to the page and commented on posts, showed their comments and their “likes,” and could be seen at any time from any place—including from the workplace.7
For another, we have held that conduct that took place outside of the physical work environment is part of the totality of the circumstances we evaluate when considering a hostile work environment claim. Little, 301 F.3d at 966–68. In Little, the rape occurred outside of the physical workplace but the reaction of the plaintiff’s employer “would have made a reasonable woman feel that her work environment had been altered” so as to defeat summary judgment for the employer. Id. at 966–67. Moreover, the Supreme Court has instructed us to consider a non-exhaustive list of the circumstances and characteristics of alleged harassment which does not distinguish between conduct occurring on or off the physical or digital worksite. See Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 532 U.S. at 270–71, 121 S.Ct. 1508. The relevant standard requires us to assess whether harassing conduct had an unreasonable effect on the working environment and, if so, to consider whether and how the employer responded to that effect. See id.; see also Fried, 18 F.4th at 650 (“Several circuit courts, including our own, have recognized that an employer’s response to a third party’s unwelcome sexual advances toward an employee can independently create a hostile work environment.”) (emphasis omitted).
*10 Applying that standard, we have concluded that offsite and third-party conduct can have the effect of altering the working environment in an objectively severe or pervasive manner. See, e.g., Galdamez v. Potter, 415 F.3d 1015, 1023–24 (9th Cir. 2005) (concluding that a reasonable juror could find racially hostile comments made by third parties, including comments outside of the workplace, “both subjectively and objectively severe or pervasive”). And we have found that evidence of management-level, intra-workplace ratification of or acquiescence to offsite conduct by employees, customers, or third parties can be particularly relevant to both the hostile work environment and employer liability elements of a Title VII claim. See, e.g., Fuller, 865 F.3d at 1162–63 (vacating grant of summary judgment for employer based on evidence that the employer “punish[ed] the [plaintiff]” for taking leave after she was raped twice outside of work and the employer “both vocally and financially support[ed] her rapist” after the fact); Little, 301 F.3d at 967–69 (reversing grant of summary judgment for employer based on evidence that employer “ratified” a business client’s off-site rape of the plaintiff “by failing to take immediate and effective corrective action” to protect the employee); Fried, 18 F.4th at 651–53 (reversing grant of summary judgment for employer where plaintiff presented evidence that the employer condoned “a customer’s overt sexual proposition” of the plaintiff in the workplace and directed the employee to continue to serve the customer). In cases where the plaintiff has experienced offensive conduct from a non-employee (as in Galdamez, Little, and Fried), or harassment outside of and unrelated to the workplace (as in Fuller) that had a foreseeable, adverse impact on the plaintiff’s working conditions, our “focus” in assessing the Title VII claim has centered on “the employer’s response to the [offensive] conduct.” Fried, 18 F.4th at 650.
1112Thus, even if discriminatory or intimidating conduct occurs wholly offsite, it remains relevant to the extent it affects the employee’s working environment. Here, Okonowsky has adduced ample evidence that Hellman’s sexually discriminatory conduct “ma[de] it more difficult for her to do her job, to take pride in her work, and to desire to stay in her position.” Fuller, 865 F.3d at 1162 (quoting Reynaga v. Roseburg Forest Prods., 847 F.3d 678, 687 (9th Cir. 2017)). The prison itself concluded as much when its Threat Assessment Team and leadership determined that Hellman’s supposedly “offsite” behavior violated the Bureau’s Anti-Harassment Policy. That violation, the prison believed, authorized it to take employment action against Hellman precisely because of his conduct’s damaging effect on Okonowsky’s working environment.
The Threat Assessment Team also found, and the prison stated in its cease-and-desist letter, that Hellman violated the Bureau’s Standards of Employee Conduct, which apply to conduct both within and outside of work. The Bureau’s standards require employees to “conduct themselves in such a manner that their activities both on and off duty do not discredit the agency,” but instead “foster[ ] respect for the Bureau of Prisons, the Department of Justice, and the U.S. Government.” Bureau of Prisons, Standards of Employee Conduct, U.S. Dep’t of Just. 5 (Dec. 6, 2013) (last visited July 9, 2024), https://perma.cc/Z6G3-VWSZ (emphasis added). In a March 24, 2014, memorandum titled “Guidance on the Personal Use of Social Media by Department Employees,” the U.S. Department of Justice explained that “government-wide standards of conduct … apply to online communications at all times, regardless of whether they are at work, outside the office, or using government equipment.” The memorandum emphasizes that “Department employees do not surrender their First Amendment rights as a result of their employment; however, the Supreme Court and lower courts have held that the Government may restrict the speech of its employees when employees are not speaking as private citizens on matters of public concern or when the Government’s interest in the efficient provision of public services outweighs its employees’ interest in the speech.” It explains that “[t]he line between public and private, personal and professional, is often blurred, especially when an employee using social media … comments on matters related to his or her work, or the work of the Department.” And it urges employees to “exercise extreme care” when making “comments that can be perceived as showing prejudice based on race, gender, sexual orientation, or any other protected basis,” as such communications “implicate the Department’s core mission of administering justice in a fair, effective, and even-handed manner.”
*11 13Lompoc’s Threat Assessment Team found that Hellman made numerous posts, including but not limited to “jokes on social media regarding inmate suicide,” such as a post mocking the suicide of Jeffery Epstein in BOP custody, that “are highly inappropriate and reflect poorly upon the BOP—especially when coming from supervisory-level employees who work in [the] SHU.” Prison leaders agreed, informing Hellman in the cease-and-desist letter that he “posted memes/information on social media that appear to violate Agency policy, including Program Statement 3420.11, Standards of Employee Conduct, and Program Statement 3713.26, Bureau of Prisons Anti-Harassment Policy.” Okonowsky has adduced ample evidence showing that prison leaders were well aware of such posts long before the prison convened the Threat Assessment Team. Construing all inferences in Okonowsky’s favor, a reasonable juror could conclude that the Bureau’s failure to take reasonably prompt and effective steps to address conduct that plainly violated numerous Bureau and Department of Justice policies signaled to Okonowsky that the Bureau had no intention of protecting her from Hellman’s harassing conduct and that Hellman could act with impunity.
A reasonable juror could also conclude that the Bureau’s lackluster response to Okonowsky’s complaint “reinforced rather than remediated” Hellman’s sexually harassing conduct, cementing the discriminatory effect of his behavior within the workplace. Little, 301 F.3d at 967–68. For all of these reasons, the government’s argument that Hellman’s social media posts “occurred” outside of work, and thus could not be considered in the totality of the circumstances surrounding Okonowsky’s Title VII claim, rings hollow.
b. Limited Consideration of Hellman’s Harassing Instagram Posts
The district court limited its consideration of the evidence to the five posts it believed were both (1) directed at Okonowsky personally, and (2) made based on Okonowsky’s sex. The district court erred in two ways by so constricting the universe of the evidence relevant to Okonowsky’s claim.
14First, the district court disregarded the well-established principle that the totality of the circumstances surrounding a Title VII claim includes offensive or retaliatory conduct which would not, in isolation, violate Title VII, Fuller, 865 F.3d at 1163 & n.9, as well as discriminatory conduct not specifically directed at the plaintiff, see Reynaga, 847 F.3d at 687 (“We have held that … hostility need not be directly targeted at the plaintiff to be relevant to his or her hostile work environment claim.”); e.g., Dominguez-Curry, 424 F.3d at 1036, 1038 (finding that the district court “erroneously disregarded evidence of discriminatory comments that [the harasser] directed to other women in the division”).
15Second, the district court failed to draw all reasonable inferences in Okonowsky’s favor when it determined that Hellman’s posts about the prison’s psychology department did not target Okonowsky specifically. The record shows that staff members at the prison understood that the creator of the “8_and_hitthe_gate” page was a custody officer in the SHU based on the page’s content. Because Okonowsky was the psychologist assigned to the SHU, responsible for all of the duties of the department in the SHU, a reasonable juror could infer—just as Hellman’s followers and the prison’s Threat Assessment Team did—that Hellman’s posts targeting “the psychologist” and the psychology department were aimed at Okonowsky specifically. Okonowsky was entitled to have this inference drawn in her favor. See Dominguez-Curry, 424 F.3d at 1035.
In sum, the evidentiary record in support of Okonowsky’s claim includes, but is not limited to, evidence that employees holding management-level positions and those who were charged with investigating violations of workplace policy condoned, acquiesced to, or otherwise reinforced Hellman’s conduct in the workplace. It also includes posts made by Hellman (as well as associated comments and “likes” by Lompoc employees) that endorsed or made light of violence against and/or sexually discriminatory views toward women; targeted Okonowsky based on her appearance; targeted Okonowsky as the SHU psychologist; reasonably appear to have been intended to intimidate or discourage Okonowsky against further complaints; and flaunted the prison’s Threat Assessment Team and workplace policies.
2. The Bureau of Prisons is not entitled to summary judgment.
*12 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Okonowsky, we conclude that Okonowsky has raised triable issues of fact as to the existence of a hostile work environment.
a. Hellman’s Conduct
16Hellman made hundreds of posts on his Instagram account over a five-month period, often posting multiple times per day. Many of his posts about women in the workplace were denigrating, suggestive of violence, and encouraged or at the very least made light of sexual harassment in the workplace. Hellman posted about Okonowsky’s all-male co-workers “gang banging” her; he described her in vulgar sexual terms; he humiliated and intimidated her for reporting his conduct to management; and he called for his “soldiers” to rally in support of him after Okonowsky complained to management. A reasonable factfinder could conclude, just as the Lompoc Threat Assessment Team and leadership ultimately did, that numerous of Hellman’s posts about Okonowsky were intended to, and had the effect of, harassing Okonowsky on the basis of her sex, humiliating and degrading her, and intimidating her in an effort to shape her behavior in the workplace and discourage future complaints about Hellman’s conduct.8
The government analogizes Okonowsky’s case to Kortan v. California Youth Authority, 217 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2000), in which we found no triable issue as to harassment because “the plaintiff alleged [only] that a supervisor referred ‘once or twice’ to another female as a ‘castrating bitch,’ ‘Madonna,’ and a ‘regina,’ ” and the “plaintiff herself did not regard this as harassing, and the supervisor never directed a sexual insult at plaintiff.” Arizona ex rel. Horne v. Geo Grp., Inc., 816 F.3d 1189, 1207 (9th Cir. 2016) (emphases added) (citing Kortan, 217 F.3d at 1106–07, 1110–11). Given the government’s concessions that Okonowsky subjectively viewed Hellman’s conduct as harassing and that Hellman directed at least five sexually discriminatory posts at Okonowsky specifically, we fail to see how Kortan is on point.
We find more guidance in our opinion in Dominguez-Curry. There, we concluded that evidence of a supervisor making “numerous demeaning comments about women in the workplace” that were similar in both severity and frequency to the comments made by Hellman, including comments directed at the plaintiff, was “more than sufficient” to preclude summary judgment to the employer on the hostile work environment element of a Title VII claim. 424 F.3d at 1033–35. Although Hellman was not Okonowsky’s direct supervisor as was the case in Dominguez-Curry, his role as a high-ranking law enforcement officer charged with protecting Okonowsky’s safety and enforcing workplace policy enhanced the objective severity and pervasiveness of his harassing conduct. See Zetwick, 850 F.3d at 445 (“[T]he Court has recognized that ‘a supervisor’s power and authority invests his or her harassing conduct with a particular threatening character.’ ”) (quoting Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 763, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998)); see also Fuller, 865 F.3d at 1163. A reasonable juror could credit Okonowsky’s testimony that, because Hellman supervised the corrections officers tasked with protecting Okonowsky within the prison, and within the SHU in particular, she found certain of his posts to be particularly “threatening,” Little, 301 F.3d at 966 (citing Breeden, 532 U.S. at 270–71, 121 S.Ct. 1508), and menacing; she did not feel safe at work; and she worried that she could not trust Hellman and his direct reports to protect her if an emergency arose. A juror could also credit Okonowsky’s testimony that Hellman’s actions made it more difficult for her to complete basic tasks and ultimately drove her to leave Lompoc. See Reynaga, 847 F.3d at 687 (explaining that unwanted discriminatory conduct that “make[s] it more difficult for [the plaintiff] to do her job, to take pride in her work, and to desire to stay in her position” is “enough” to “create an actionable claim under Title VII”). These facts alone raise a genuine dispute as to whether the work environment was sufficiently hostile to implicate Title VII. See Davis, 520 F.3d at 1096 (“[Even] where the severity of frequent abuse is questionable, it is more appropriate to leave the assessment to the fact-finder than for the court to decide the case on summary judgment.”).
b. The Conduct of Management and Other Co-workers
*13 As we have already explained, Okonowsky’s evidence does not start and end with Hellman’s conduct. Both management and Okonowsky’s co-workers contributed to the altered workplace. Many employees at Lompoc “liked” Hellman’s posts and commented favorably upon them. Okonowsky witnessed co-workers discussing and laughing about Hellman’s posts at work. And managers and staff members in charge of enforcing workplace policy and investigating Okonowsky’s complaint acquiesced to and at times even endorsed Hellman’s conduct. The Human Resources Manager, the Union President, and the prison’s Safety Manager subscribed to Hellman’s page despite its offensive content. The Safety Manager and Human Resources Manager both told Okonowsky the page was “funny,” even as Okonowsky expressed her concerns about being targeted and harassed. The Special Investigative Agent tasked with investigating Okonowsky’s complaint told her that he did not “see anything that’s a problem” with Hellman’s page despite recent posts targeting Okonowsky and joking about the SHU officers sexually assaulting her. Prison officials made no apparent effort to protect Okonowsky’s confidentiality after she made her complaint. The investigating officer told Okonowsky that he failed to refer her complaint to the Bureau’s Office of Internal Affairs for three weeks because he “had other things going on” and “could not figure out how to print the memes.” The warden testified that he “took no action” on Okonowsky’s complaint for at least two months, and the Lompoc prison apparently tolerated Hellman’s harassing conduct for another month after telling him that any further harassment would “not be tolerated.”
c. The Cumulative Effect of the Discriminatory Conduct
17We must also consider “the cumulative effect of the conduct at issue.” Zetwick, 850 F.3d at 444 (emphasis omitted). That includes three months of posts targeting Okonowsky, intimidating her, joking about “gang bang[ing]” her, possibly shooting her, as well as myriad posts endorsing sexual harassment and/or violence toward women co-workers or women generally. It includes the reactions of management-level officials who endorsed Hellman’s conduct even as Okonowsky expressed her concerns, and the refusal of prison officials to respond to or update Okonowsky on the status of the investigation even as Okonowsky expressed that she no longer felt safe at work.
18Just as an “employer’s reaction to a single serious episode” of sexual harassment “may form the basis for a hostile work environment claim,” Little, 301 F.3d at 968, so too may an employer’s response to more frequent but less severe conduct, see Fuller, 865 F.3d at 1163–64 (distinguishing Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 921–22, 924, 926 (9th Cir. 2000), in which an employer “took no actions which could be perceived as supportive of the harasser”). Based on the record as we must view it, we hold that a reasonable juror could find Okonowsky’s work environment objectively hostile.
B. The Bureau’s Remedial Measures
192021Considering all the evidence in the light most favorable to Okonowsky, a reasonable juror could also conclude that the Bureau’s response to Okonowsky’s harassment was neither reasonably immediate nor effective, triggering liability under Title VII. “All federal circuits are in accord” that an employer is liable for a hostile work environment “by failing to take immediate and corrective action in response to a co-worker’s or third party’s sexual harassment … [that] the employer knew or should have known about.” Fried, 18 F.4th at 647. “[T]he reasonableness of an employer’s remedy will depend on its ability to stop harassment by the person who engaged in harassment.” Little, 301 F.3d at 968 (quoting Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 882 (9th Cir. 1991)). If “the remedy attempted is ineffectual, liability will attach.” Id. (quoting Fuller v. City of Oakland (Fuller Oakland), 47 F.3d 1522, 1528–29 (9th Cir. 1995)). “In evaluating the adequacy of the remedy, the court may also take into account the remedy’s ability to persuade potential harassers to refrain from unlawful conduct.” Id. (quoting Ellison, 924 F.2d at 882).
The district court concluded based on “undisputed facts” that the Bureau “engaged [in] a methodical, albeit relatively lengthy, investigative and disciplinary process.” Examining only five posts made by Hellman prior to the issuance of the cease-and-desist letter, the district court concluded that Hellman’s conduct “posting memes of a sexual nature potentially directed to [Okonowsky]” stopped “because of [the Bureau’s] investigative efforts.” This conclusion is unsupported and applies the wrong legal standard. The facts viewed most favorably to Okonowsky lead to the opposite finding. Moreover, the district court was required to determine whether Okonowsky adduced sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to conclude that the prison’s investigation was, in fact, not methodical or effective—not to make its own findings of fact. See Fuller, 865 F.3d at 1165 (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)).
1. Management’s Initial Response
*14 22Okonowsky has adduced ample evidence that the Bureau’s response to Hellman’s harassing conduct and management figures’ endorsement of it was “equivocal at best.” Little, 301 F.3d at 968. On the one hand, Warden Engleman met with Okonowsky the day she requested a meeting and immediately directed Agent Gonzales to investigate Okonowsky’s complaint and make a referral to the Office of Internal Affairs. The prison transferred Okonowsky to the low security facility with her consent that same day. Eventually, Gonzales made a referral to the Office of Internal Affairs as directed. And the prison convened a Threat Assessment Team which, within a matter of days, determined that Hellman’s conduct likely violated the Bureau’s Anti-Harassment Policy and recommended issuing a cease-and-desist letter, which the prison promptly did.
On the other hand, Warden Engleman testified that he had “no involvement” at any time with Okonowsky’s complaint while he was the Acting Warden, which was a period of over two months after she complained to him. At most, he referred her complaint to Gonzales, who then did almost nothing to resolve the situation, telling Okonowsky from the get-go that he believed there was nothing wrong with Hellman’s behavior. Consistent with that view, Gonzales slow-walked the investigation and demonstrated a lack of care for Okonowsky’s confidentiality and safety. The prison’s Safety Manager and Human Resources Manager both told Okonowsky that they found Hellman’s page to be “funny,” and each continued to subscribe to Hellman’s page on Instagram after Okonowsky made her complaint, even as Hellman posted harassing content that increasingly targeted Okonowsky. Prison officials immediately suggested transferring Okonowsky, and ultimately did so with her consent, but Okonowsky continued to see Hellman at work, and he continued to make discriminatory and retaliatory posts. Despite the fact that numerous Lompoc employees, including the Human Resources Manager, were well aware that Hellman operated the page, it was not until Okonowsky herself identified Hellman as the creator of the page that the prison transferred Hellman to a different part of the facility—more than three weeks after Okonowsky initially made her complaint.9 In whole, three months passed after Okonowsky made her complaint before Hellman’s harassing conduct ceased. Such “equivocal” evidence—particularly evidence that some of the initial steps taken by the prison “reinforced rather than remediated the harassment,” Little, 301 F.3d at 967, and were “ineffectual” to stop Hellman’s conduct or managers’ endorsement of it, Fuller Oakland, 47 F.3d at 1528–29—precludes granting summary judgment to the prison.
2. Management’s Permanent Remedial Steps
2324In addition to reviewing “the temporary steps the employer takes to deal with the situation,” we must also look at “the permanent remedial steps the employer takes once it has completed its investigation.” Swenson v. Potter, 271 F.3d 1184, 1192 (9th Cir. 2001). “Remedial action must include some form of disciplinary measures.” Reynaga, 847 F.3d at 689 (citing Yamaguchi v. U.S. Dep’t of the Air Force, 109 F.3d 1475, 1482 (9th Cir. 1997)). The remedial measures must also be effective. Id. at 690.
25The district court appears to have concluded that the Threat Assessment Team’s report ended the prison’s investigation and that the cease-and-desist letter was a “disciplinary measure” for the purposes of Title VII. In so concluding, the district court overlooked evidence that the Threat Assessment Team’s report was not a completed investigation into Hellman’s conduct. The Threat Assessment Team noted in its report that “an investigation into Hellman’s actions” was yet to be “completed,” and any discipline would need to be “implemented” “if misconduct is sustained.” Five months later, Hellman told Bureau authorities that he believed an investigation was ongoing but that he had “not been interviewed” and “ha[d] no idea” who was investigating. To the extent the Bureau’s investigation continued after the Threat Assessment Team made its recommendations to the Warden, the record is silent as to whether the Bureau ever completed that investigation or whether it made any final determination as to discipline.
*15 Even if the Threat Assessment Team report were a “completed [ ] investigation,” Swenson, 271 F.3d at 1192, and the cease-and-desist letter a “disciplinary measure[ ]” for the purposes of Title VII, Reynaga, 847 F.3d at 689, a reasonable juror could conclude that neither was sufficiently prompt or adequate to remedy Okonowsky’s hostile work environment. Neither actually stopped Hellman from posting. The Threat Assessment Team did not investigate the conduct of management-level or investigatory employees who subscribed to and/or endorsed or condoned Hellman’s conduct. And the Bureau’s statement to Hellman that further harassing conduct would “not be tolerated” was belied by the prison’s continued tolerance of Hellman’s harassing conduct for more than a month following the cease-and-desist letter. Hellman’s behavior and the facial endorsement of that behavior by high-level managers in charge of enforcing the prison policies which the Bureau believed Hellman violated, demonstrates that the remedies undertaken by the Bureau likely would not deter potential harassers from similar conduct in the future. See Reynaga, 847 F.3d at 690 (finding a genuine dispute of fact as to whether the employer’s response was effective when the harassing conduct continued “even after meeting with management”).
26Finally, the district court relied upon an impermissible inference when it concluded that Hellman deleted his Instagram page “because of [the Bureau’s] investigative efforts.” (Emphasis added). The record is silent with respect to Hellman’s motive for deleting his Instagram page after four months of publishing multiple hundreds of posts. Because Hellman continued posting harassing content, including content targeting Okonowsky, for approximately one month after receiving the cease-and-desist letter with no apparent penalty, acknowledgement by prison officials, or signs of any continuing investigation, a triable issue exists as to whether Hellman’s decision to delete his Instagram account was in fact motivated by reasons other than fear of the prison’s “investigative efforts.”
For all of these reasons, a reasonable juror could conclude that the prison “failed to take prompt and effective remedial action” to address Okonowsky’s hostile work environment. Reynaga, 847 F.3d at 689.
